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ABSTRACT 
The challenges that Iran poses are, arguably, some of the most significant foreign policy 
issues leading Washington’s agendas today. Iran’s power projection and regional 
ambitions, according to many American politicians and social scientists, defy the U.S. 
and its allies in the region. However, more than three decades of U.S. foreign policies 
towards Iran, including economic sanctions, political pressure and intimidation  have 
neither altered the Islamic authority’s aggressive diplomacy nor achieved regime change; 
instead, these foreign policy choices—by arousing nationalist sentiment and revealing a 
collective sense of discontent toward American policies among many Iranians—have 
actually facilitated hardliners in gaining public support. In this context, this thesis, by 
assessing the lessons learned from previous U.S. strategies, their successes and failures, 
and by considering the unintentional consequences, many of which caused a backlash 
among the Iranian people, as well as by examining the political and social climate that 
exists in Iran today, looks for a sustainable, viable and ultimately successful resolution 
within the Iranian society. 
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 1
I. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES TOWARD 
REVOLUTIONARY IRAN: MISCALCULATING TEHRAN’S 
POWER PROJECTION AND IGNORING THE NATIONAL 
CHARACTER OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The prolonged Iranian question is arguably one of the most salient foreign policy 
issues topping United States’ agendas today. Iran’s power projection and regional 
ambitions defy the U.S. and its allies in the region as well as undermine the Middle East 
peace process.1 More than three decades of U.S. foreign policies towards Iran—economic 
sanctions, political pressure, containment, intimidation and rogue state rollback—have 
neither altered Islamic authority’s aggressive diplomacy nor achieved regime change; 
instead, these foreign policy choices—by arousing nationalist sentiment and revealing a 
collective sense of discontent toward American policy among many Iranians—have 
actually facilitated hardliners in gaining public support. Furthermore, these same policies 
have also adversely affected U.S. domestic/international political and economic national 
interests. 
In the context of analyzing the political and social climate that exists in Iran 
today, this thesis attempts to address the following questions: Has U.S. foreign policy 
achieved its objectives in dealing with challenges posed by Iran since the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution? If not, what are the reasons that lie behind this U.S. political breakdown? 
Secondarily, this thesis will also consider the following questions: Is the Islamic Republic 
of Iran an actual threat to global security or is it more specifically a challenge to the 
United States and its allies in particular? What are the unintentional consequences of U.S. 
foreign policies toward Iran? Has U.S. foreign policy assisted rising hardliners and 
facilitated public support for them? Finally, this thesis will examine alternative policy 
options for United States’ policy makers dealing with Iran. 
                                                 
1 Frederic Wehrey, et al. Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of 
Iranian Power in the Middle East. (Santa Monica, CA : RAND Project Air Force, 2009), 1. 
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Undoubtedly, the challenges posed by Iran have been one of the foremost 
concerns of U.S. foreign policy makers for more than half a decade. Underlining nuclear 
efforts and the desire for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in ambitions of the Iranian 
regime, George W. Bush warns: “We may face no greater challenge from a single 
country than from Iran.”2 In the same vein, by emphasizing the failure of his 
predecessor’s inability to deal with the challenges that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
presented the Unites States, President Barack Obama cautioned, in the 2010 U.S. 
National Security Strategy, that “Iran’s behavior became more threatening.”3 Looking 
beyond its nuclear aspirations, the Iranian regime’s support for terrorism worldwide, 
intimidating rhetoric toward Israel, inhibitive strategy toward Middle East peace and Iraqi 
state-building processes, as well as its domestic human rights abuses have generated 
broader concerns for the United States regarding Iran.4 The Islamic Republic’s neighbors 
and Israel share many U.S. concerns, although they often evaluate those challenges 
differently than the U.S. when calculating their own relationship with or policies toward 
Iran.5 
By considering the challenges Iran poses, many political studies on Iran suppose 
that the U.S. has to deal with the Iranian question one way or another. Some scholarly 
pieces and policy papers, however, depict the Iranian question as “tough” and 
“unsolvable.”6 In this context, this thesis, by assessing the lessons learned from previous 
strategies’ success and failure and by considering their unintentional consequences, 
which caused a backlash among the Iranian people, looks for a sustainable, viable and 
ultimately successful resolution within the Iranian society, rather than via third-party, 
external actor solutions such as sanctions and containment strategies.  
                                                 
2 The United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2006), 20. 
3 The United States, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 26. 
4 The United States, (2006), 20. 
5 Casey L. Addis, et al., Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. policy October 7, 2009. CRS Report for 
Congress, Congressional Research Service (2009), 1. 
6 Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays. A US Strategy for Iran. Walker Paper, (Alabama: Air 
University Press, 2008), 1. 
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The major challenge in dealing with the Iranian question has been the mutual 
mistrust and undiplomatic discourse that typified United States-Iranian relations since the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Islamic revolution also marked the beginning of 
the deadlock and hostility between the two parties, which never lost its vehemence for 
more than three decades. Successive U.S. administration officials’ characterizations of 
Iran as a “rogue” state and their allegations regarding Iran’s efforts to acquire WMD and 
promotion of terrorism worldwide, coupled with the Iranian regime’s insolent response 
toward the U.S. as a retaliatory measure, have comprised some of the major reasons of 
rising animosity between these two nations.7 These factors that are source of mutual 
hostility between both countries have also constituted the main determinative of U.S. and 
Iran foreign policies, priorities and objectives in the region. 
Another problem preventing resolution regarding the Iranian question includes the 
Iranian hardliners’ attitudes against the United States and perceptions of U.S. policies as 
threatening to their sovereignty. From the Iranian administration’s perspective, the U.S. 
accusations and allegations have no solid basis in reality. Tehran has categorically denied 
these accusations and allegations and has defined U.S. policy toward the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as “antagonistic” and “contemptuous” since the fall of Iran’s pro-
American monarchy. Iranian administration officials vocally condemned U.S. foreign 
policy, which—according to them—aims to regain its previous influence in Iran and 
materialize “U.S. hegemonic” goals in the region.8 The U.S. military presence in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf has been considered a siege, threatening Iran’s 
sovereignty. Furthermore, Tehran believes that “the Iranian Islamic government’s 
autonomous foreign and domestic policies pose a challenge to the U.S.-led Western 
bloc’s preponderant political, military and economic influence in the Persian Gulf and 
 
 
                                                 
7 Gawdat Bahgat, “Iran and the United States: Reconcilable Differences?” Iranian Studies 36, no. 2 
(April 2008): 141. 
8 Enyatollah Yazdani and Hussain Rizwan, “United States’ Policy towards Iran after the Islamic 
Revolution: An Iranian Perspective.” International Studies 43 no.3 (2006): 267. 
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Southwest Asia.”9  Finally, the U.S.’s support for domestic opposition movements 
against the Iranian regime have been perceived as meddling in Iran’s affairs and 
denounced by Iranian hardliners in the government.10 
In addition to the long-lasting animosity between both parties, the unintentional 
consequences of U.S. strategies toward Iran constitute another challenge throughout the 
problem-solving process. In this context, this thesis claims that the unintentional 
consequences of U.S. policy implementation in the region actually assists Iranian 
hardliners’ justification of their anti-Western and aggressive domestic and foreign 
policies, as well as gaining their support by generating oppositional collective national 
sentiments among the Iranian people against a post-Cold War new American foreign 
policy toward Iran. Despite the challenges discussed above, when considering the Iranian 
question, this thesis assumes that by using holistic insights and innovative and systematic 
thinking, the Iranian question can ultimately be solved. 
United States foreign policy toward Iran, for more than three decades, lacked 
necessary cultural, historical, and ideological context. U.S. policymakers consistently 
failed to capture the essence of Iranian identity and what it means to be ‘Iranian’ in a 
more holistic sense. What inspires Iranians? Why do many Iranians stress the importance 
of the Iranian revolution as a key transition point in its storied past? Do U.S. 
policymakers consider the strength and power the influence of Islam wields on Iranian 
life, foreign policy, and the story of the Iranian people in their context and from their 
perspective? Iran, like many countries—including France and Turkey, among others—
places a weighty emphasis on history and the once-powerful empires of which they were 
a part. This largely misdirected and oft misunderstood perception of Iranian intentions, 
coupled with the dynamism inherent in international posturing, led U.S. president after 
president from one failed policy to the next when it came to dealing with the unique case 
of Iran.  
                                                 
9 Enyatollah Yazdani and Hussain Rizwan, “United States’ Policy towards Iran after the Islamic 
Revolution: An Iranian Perspective.” International Studies 43 no.3 (2006): 267. 
10 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran's Crumbling Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 82 no.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2003):44–
57.  
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A cookie-cutter approach toward Iran was often applied, despite its unique 
characteristics. Additionally, U.S. leadership relied on second-hand information and the 
perceptions of allied partners—in addition to regional enemies—who had their own 
national interests at the heart of their recommendations to the United States, providing a 
misleading, distorted political framework to operate within. It is this rather blatant 
ignorance on the part of Washington decision makers that led to continued faulty, 
misinformed strategic miscalculations when interfacing with Tehran. A former CIA agent 
who provided key inputs to three successive U.S. presidents, Bruce Riedel, underscores 
this point. He states that “for thirty years, the United States has tried to deal with Iran and 
its revolutionary ideology without a well-grounded understanding of what motivates and 
inspires Iranians.”11 
Three important factors—national pride, resentment toward external meddling 
and Ithna Ashari Shi’ism as a state religion—have had great influence on Iranian national 
behavior. If these tenets, which are at the crux of the worldview of Iranian people and 
leaders are ignored or otherwise dismissed, as many scholars indicate, it makes it nearly 
impossible to understand the current political behavior and power projection of Iran. 
Chapter II, in this context, will address the source of these three main characteristics of 
the Iranian people, often overlooked by “beltway” politicians. 
Although the consideration and attention given studies of each of the challenges 
posed by Iran individually demonstrate diversity, unquestionably, many politicians and 
scholars share similar ideas regarding these issues. Some of the key issues include the 
Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons ambitions, its support for terrorism, and its efforts to 
undermine the Middle East peace and Iraqi state-building processes.12 However, the 
question of whether or not the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly its nuclear agenda, 
actually poses a threat to global security is still a subject of intense scholarly debate. 
Indeed, the debates often center on the challenges Iran poses to Western governments, the 
 
                                                 
11 Bruce Riedel, “America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,” 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 15, no.1 (Winter 2008): 101. 
12 R. Nicholas Burns, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran.” Vital Speeches of the Day, 73 no.6 (June 2007): 
252–257. 
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motivations behind Iranian foreign policy-makers and the projected future trends in 
Iranian strategy. Is Iran an ideologically driven, irrational state? Or can it otherwise be 
argued that Iran is, in fact, the model of a pragmatic rational state?  
Chapter III, therefore, addresses the domestic and foreign policy drivers 
underscoring Iranian national interests from the onset of the Islamic Republic. This 
chapter also analyzes Iranian worldviews and affiliated threat perceptions, emphasizing 
the associated pragmatic ideological framework Tehran operate within. This is often 
contrary to U.S. perceptions of Tehran, since the U.S. does not often consider Iran a 
rational actor in the international political playground. The latter portion of this chapter 
underlines the preeminent themes prevalent in Iranian regional strategy. At first blush, 
Iranian regional strategy may seem ideologically driven and expansionist. However, 
when viewed through a different lens, these themes stress a broad-based, multi-layered 
homeland defense and regime survival strategy. 
Chapter IV analyses the policy implications of several successive U.S. 
administrations, from Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama, attempting to deal with the 
perceived challenged Iran posed. This chapter also presents both the unintentional 
domestic and international consequences of the U.S. strategy in the region. Additionally, 
this part of the thesis examines the underlying causes of the rising hostility between the 
U.S. and Iranian regimes over time. 
For nearly three decades, a myriad of pundits have proposed various ways to deal 
with Tehran and its seemingly confrontational ideology. On one hand, some scholars and 
politicians see Iran as an enemy and assume that the only way to solve the Iranian 
question is to defeat Iran using whatever options are required to achieve this goal, 
including military strikes.13 On the other hand, other scholars and politicians suggest that 
the best strategy for dealing with Iran is to maintain or strengthen current economic 
sanctions and the political isolation of the country rather than the use of military 
                                                 
13 Michael Ledeen, Accomplice to Evil: Iran and the War Against the West. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2009. And, Thomas Holsinger, “Military Force Is the Best Option for Dealing with Iran,” in Is Iran a 
Threat to Global Security?, edited by Julia Bauder 65–77 (New York: Greenhaven Press, 2006). 
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intervention.14 Yet a third policy recommendation for solving the Iranian problem comes 
from reformist-minded politicians and scholars who believe in the importance of bilateral 
and multilateral political negotiations and who advocate an engagement option designed 
to achieve the elusive ultimate success with Iran instead of economic sanctions and 
political isolations. In this context, Chapter V analyzes four different U.S. policy options 
attempting to deal with the Iranian question prevalently argued in scholarly literature: the 
Military Option, Regime Change, Containment, and Engagement Option. 
B. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Scrutinizing and analyzing political and social transformations in Iran and 
examining shifting U.S. foreign strategy over time is essential not only for understanding 
the contemporary situation in the region and challenges posed by Iran, but also to come 
up with new proposals addressing these challenges. In this context, the study employs a 
historical analysis method in order to understand the U.S.-Iran relationship over time; it 
also uses a political analysis method with quantitative and qualitative research techniques 
to evaluate former U.S. administrations’ foreign strategies, and it presents 
recommendations for incumbent and future U.S. administrations. 
This thesis employs data obtained through scholarly secondary sources such as 
books, articles in journals and newspapers, government documents and publications, 
research centers’ reports and documentaries. In addition to the aforementioned sources, 
this study, particularly the last chapter, uses primary sources, such as public opinion polls 
conducted with Iranian people by World Public Opinion, Terror Free Tomorrow and Pew 




                                                 
14 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iran: Three Alternative Futures,” The Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 10 no.2 (June 2006); Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays. A US Strategy for Iran. Walker 
Paper (Alabama: Air University Press, 2008). 
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II. UNDERSTANDING IRAN: THE INFLUENCE OF PAST 
EXPERIENCES AND RELIGION ON IRANIAN AFFAIRS 
According to a foreign policy metaphor, past experiences affect nations’ future 
behaviors, shape their judgment of present realities of life and form their national traits. 
Some experiences and memories have such a deep impact on a nation’s consciousness 
that they are passed on from generation to generation and never lose their influence or 
historical allure, even when no longer justified by current realities.15 This claim can be 
applied almost perfectly to Iran’s case. According to many scholars, the Iranian people 
have a “visceral” tie with their past. Therefore, the influence of past experiences plays a 
significant role in determining Iran’s foreign policy and international relations, 
particularly with the U.S. and Middle Eastern countries. 
In the literature regarding Iran, many scholars share a consensus that there are 
three interrelated characteristics of the Iranian people, derived largely from their shared 
past—nationalistic pride, resentment toward foreign interference and strategic shi’a 
marginalization—shaping Iran’s international orientation.16 Iranian policymakers, 
“consciously” or not, have been intensely affected not only by their country’s extensive 
and glorious history but also by its traumatic past experiences with foreign powers.  
Another critical element that dramatically impacts Iranian leaders’ strategic 
decision making is their officially sanctioned state religion, Shi’a Islam. Shi’i religio-
cultural traditions have always been at the heart of Iranian society and politics. In 
particular, three central aspects of Shi'ite Islam—the imamate (the successors to Ali), 
loyalty to Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic scholars (the concept of Mujtahid) and the 
uprising against oppressors (Kerbela Motif)—have been transformed into political 
                                                 
15 Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), 7. 
16 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Holt 
Paperbacks, 2006). Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New 
York: Random House, 2004). And, William R. Polk, Understanding Iran: Everything You Need to Know, 
From Persia to the Islamic Republic, from Cyrus to Ahmedinejad (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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discourse and activities in Iran.17 If these tenets, which are at the crux of the worldview 
of Iranian people and leaders, are ignored or otherwise dismissed as many scholars 
indicate, it makes it nearly impossible to understand the current political behavior and 
power of projection of Iran. For example, when emphasizing the past failures of U.S. 
negotiations dealing with the Iranian issue, Limbert notes, “American negotiators need 
not be scholars of Iran or know all about, for example, the Sassanians, Samanids, and 
Safavids. They should, however, at least be aware of the past that has gone into forming 
the views and approaches of the Iranian side.”18 In this context, this chapter focuses on 
three historical elements, national pride, a deep and historic resentment of external 
meddling into Iranian domestic affairs and the central concepts of Shi’a Islam, which 
have significant influences on current Iranian political behavior. 
A. NATIONAL PRIDE 
In his book, The Persian Puzzle, Kenneth Pollack describes Persia (which in 1935 
became the state of Iran): “In its days, the Persian Empire was a super power like nothing 
the world had ever seen—with a monotheistic religion, a vast army, a rich civilization, a 
new and remarkable efficient method of administration, and territory stretching from 
Egypt to Central Asia.”19 Pollack stresses that the seven-millennial glorious Persian 
history is a major source of national pride for Iranians. The Iranian people, as well as 
their leaders, know their history well. In every stage of their education, from primary 
school to university, they constantly learn Persian history. Art, poetry and folklore 
persistently emphasize ancient Persian greatness. This historical awareness of the Iranian 
people forms a corresponding belief that Iran is historically superior to other nations in 
the region. As such, Iran should become the dominant actor in its neighborhood. In the 
same vein, Iranians also reject the hegemonic tendencies of other nations, especially 
                                                 
17 A.K. Ramakrishnan, U.S. Perseption of Iran: Approaches and Policies (New Delhi: New Century 
Puplication, 2008), 17. 
18 John W. Limbert, Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 15. 
19 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 3. 
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while conducting state-to-state relations.20 Ray Takeyh, in his book, Hidden Iran, 
explains the nature of the Iranian perception of self-superiority. He states that perhaps 
more so than any other country in its region, Iran perceives itself as the leading nation 
among those in its immediate neighborhood. Through successive generations, Iran’s 
historical spirit has embedded itself in the minds of its people and been a large part of the 
uniqueness and splendor associated with the Iranian identity and what it means to be 
Iranian. The contemporary Iranian identity is strongly linked to the perceived important 
contributions they have singularly made to civilization writ large over the course of their 
history.  This sense of superiority sits at the center of Iranian worldview and 
psychology—over the Arabs or the Turks in their geographic neighborhood. Although the 
Persian Empire declined in size and influence over the centuries vis-à-vis newly 
emerging, appealing Western cultures, the Iranian ego and its sense of self importance in 
the world was largely retained. Although Iran is no longer the great Persian Empire of the 
days of the ancient scholars and great historical anthologies—and in fact has been 
overshadowed by new superpowers over the course of time—its perception of itself is as 
if it is still the Persian Empire of old. As such, they should still be the regional 
hegemon.21  
Tehran’s international relations in the region, not merely with the Arab states but 
also with Central Asian governments and Israel, as well as its nuclear ambitions today 
illustrate that Iran still pursues the objective of becoming a regional power. Iranian public 
support for their leaders geared toward achieving Iran’s stated national objectives is yet 
another element demonstrating the importance of national pride in Iranian society. 
B. RESENTMENT TO EXTERNAL MEDDLING: GREAT BRITAIN AND 
SOVIET RUSSIA 
Iranian behavior has, in large part, been shaped by a nationalistic pride derived 
from its glorious yet distant history. However, this national pride finds even deeper roots 
in Iranians’ resentment toward foreign intervention in domestic and foreign affairs. 
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Throughout its modern history, Iran has been subject to territorial contraction, 
exploitation and manipulation by foreign powers. Over the last two centuries, humiliating 
experiences such as these remain exceptionally vivid in Iranians’ minds and place more 
than a small dent in their national pride.22 
In 1813, Persia lost what is today’s Azerbaijan, Dagestan and Eastern Georgia to 
Russia at the end of the first Russo-Persian War under the Treaty of Gulistan. This treaty 
simultaneously marked the beginning of the “great game,” the strategic rivalry between 
Britain and Russia aimed at achieving supremacy in Central Asia. Between 1857 and 
1928, the Persian Empire’s territorial losses later increased to include western 
Afghanistan, Balochistan, Turkmenistan and the Caucasus.23  
Sharp, heightened feelings of national dishonor accompanied these territorial 
losses, which also brought about decreasing political and economic independence. The 
increasing foreign encroachment and political gaming and manipulation of Iranian 
domestic affairs by the then-superpowers of Russia and Britain, in addition to the 
international dynamic resulting from the weakness of Iran’s Qajar dynasty, fuelled a 
growing national fervor and consciousness among Iranian society, notably in scattered 
urban bazaars and among religious figures (ulema).24  
Through the end of nineteenth century, the newly emerging Iranian middle class 
(the bazaatist and ulema)—later known as the traditional middle class—argued that the 
best way to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Iran was to generate a 
fundamental transformation in the Iranian political system. Under the influence of 
nationalist sentiments, the middle class began to incite revolutionary activities, resulting 
in the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1906. This revolutionary movement achieved its 
unimaginable goal, and forced the Shah of Persia, Muzaffer al-Din Shah, to establish 
Iran’s first parliament (Majles) in August, 1906 and to promulgate the first constitution in 
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December 1906.25 The 1906 Iranian Constitution guaranteed several new democratic 
individual rights to Iranian people, including freedom of speech and of the press. The 
constitution also granted equal rights among individuals. Additionally, the Iranian 
Parliament (Majles) was given the authority to approve or veto monarchical activities, 
including when the monarch desired to sign a treaty or request a loan from another 
government.26 The democratically elected new Majles adopted an imperial foreign policy 
vis-à-vis the great powers under the banner of “neither East nor West” (na sharq na 
gharb). 
However, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, which had started with great 
expectations and with the promises of the “dawn of a new era,” the “gateway to a bright 
future,” and the “reawakening of an ancient civilization” eventually failed to achieve its 
goals.27 On the contrary, it dragged the country to the edge of disintegration instead. As 
the Great Game continued in the early part of the twentieth century between Russia and 
Great Britain, Iran became another pawn in the match. As such, in 1907, the two 
superpowers du jour partitioned Persia into northern and southern spheres of influence. 
The northern part belonged to Russia while Great Britain took the south. At no point did 
Persia take part in nor even have awareness of these political negotiations.28 Besides its 
territorial losses, Persians also lost their political and economic independence. Persia 
became another piece of collateral with which the Great Powers could play in the great 
game, generating acute feelings of national dishonor among Iranians.29 
Likewise, the isolationist and impartial foreign policy, adopted by the Iranian 
government, rejecting the Western and Eastern powers’ hegemonic tendencies, resulted 
in a military coup plotted by the British in 1921 that was aimed at Iranian regime change. 
The coup brought “pro-Western” and “anti-communist” Reza Khan (later Reza Shah 
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Pahlavi) into power in 1921 as founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty.  Under Reza Shah’s 
reign, Iran became increasingly subject to British political and economic influence.30 
Following the nineteenth century territorial losses, the twentieth century oil 
exploitation by foreign powers created constant humiliation strongly resented by Iranians. 
In 1901, Persia granted British subject William D’Arcy a sixty-year concession for oil 
throughout the country, except for the five northern providences bordering Russia, in 
return for a 16 percent share of any oil profits. Immediately after the first oil exploration 
in Iran, The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was founded in 1909. The British 
government’s decision to make structural changes in vessels, converting them from coal-
burning to oil-burning, in 1912 made the newly-discovered Persian oil sources crucial for 
the British marine trade and naval power on the eve of the World War I. In 1914, the 
British government bought a 51 percent share of the APOC, which gave the British 
overall control of Iranian oil. The APOC (later known as AIOC, or the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company) grew rapidly and became the fifth largest oil producer in the world within a 
short time. 
The British Imperial Bank of Persia (BIBP) was another significant concession 
granted to the British by Qajars in 1885. The BIBP, with its monopoly rights over 
banknotes, and the AIOC, with its enormous financial power, became the twin pillars of 
British economic and political influence over Iran during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Many Iranians perceived the power and influence wielded by the AIOC and the 
BIBP as an affront to their country and their national pride and dignity. From the Iranian 
perspective, both British organizations operated in a colonial manner. Many Iranians 
believed that AIOC was underreporting its profits in order to pay smaller profit shares to 
the Iranian government.31 Similarly, Iranians also believed the AIOC was using an unfair 
taxation system, favoring the British government, and was selling oil to the British at 
reduced prices. Moreover, by exporting cheap labor from India, the AIOC further fueled 
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the anger not only of nationalists, but of the entire population. Local Iranians working for 
the AIOC found themselves laboring in unconscionable working conditions and lived in 
shantytowns (paper city) without electricity or running water.32  
In reality, the living conditions of many Iranians was not that much different than 
those who worked for the AIOC. The oil revenue had little effect on Iran’s economy as 
well as the average Iranian’s standard of living. The oil sector, one of the largest in the 
world, reinforced the British economy and military power rather than improve Iranian 
socioeconomic life. During the 1930s, Reza Shah attempted to regulate the Iranian tax 
system, orchestrate a new deal with the AIOC and insulate Iran against foreign 
manipulation. However, the British had such significant influence, both on the Shah and 
on the Majles decisions that Reza Shah eventually failed to achieve his goals. 
World War II worsened Iran’s situation both economically and politically.  At the 
beginning of the war, Reza Shah’s relationship with Germany was relatively positive. 
The Shah perceived Germany as a third-party power that would be able to ensure Iranian 
freedom from both Russian and British dominance. However, this underestimated 
Russian and British power, which resulted in a British and Russian invasion of Iran and 
ended Reza Shah’s rule in 1941, demonstrating the influence and impact foreign powers 
had on Iranian domestic politics.33 In 1941, once again, foreign powers directly played a 
role in Iranian domestic affairs by overthrowing Shah Reza Pahlavi. The new incumbent 
of Iran’s Peacock Throne became Mohammed Reza, a Shah who was more appropriate to 
the aims and goals of the Great Powers. 
During the interwar period, the British and Russian governments increased their 
control over Iranian domestic affairs. Allied powers monopolized roads, railroads and 
vehicles, and utilized Iranian manpower, equipment and structures for their own needs 
without demonstrating any consideration for the welfare of local Iranians. More 
importantly, however, Soviet Russia assisted Marxist groups in Iran, particularly Tudeh 
party’s (Party of the Masses of Iran) leaders, who had been jailed by Reza Shah. Moscow 
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employed the Tudeh party to induce separatist sentiment among Iran’s Kurdish and Azeri 
people in order to implement its communist ideology and maintain control over northern 
Iran as well as to obtain oil concessions. Moreover, Russia maintained its military 
presence even after the war by violating the Tehran Declaration signed by Roosevelt, 
Churchill and Stalin in 1943. Soviet hegemonic and disruptive attitudes caused political 
upheavals and instability in Iran. 
The failure of the Shah to deal with the unfair strategies of the AIOC as well as 
other Iranian economic challenges, in addition to the political instability in the country, 
resulted in the formation of a broad nationalist coalition—the National Front—under the 
leadership of Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq in 1949. The National Front was embraced by 
almost every faction of society, including the new middle class (liberal reformists), the 
traditional middle class (the ulema and bazarist), as well as socialists and nationalists 
who belonged to different religious sects. The National Front consolidated its power via 
the stimulus generated from anti-Shah sentiments arising from the Pahlavi dynasty’s 
weak governance and xenophobic feelings, largely originating from resentment of foreign 
exploitation.34  
The main political goals of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the National Front were to 
establish and extend a constitutional and democratic government as well as to eliminate 
subversion of foreign interests by the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, which 
had been under British control since 1914.35 The rising popularity of Mosaddeq among 
Iranian society, in addition to nationalist-flavored public demonstrations eventually 
vectored the Majles toward a pro-Mosaddeq position.36 In 1951, Mosaddeq was elected 
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as the new prime minister of Iran by gaining the greater majority of the Majles votes. 
Notably, during the Pahlavi dynasty, Mosaddeq was the only democratically elected 
prime minister over the course of almost six decades.37  
The Mosaddeq government adopted a new foreign policy referred to as “negative 
equilibrium policy”—or Siyasata Movazehene Manfi. This style of foreign policy 
preferred termination of concessions already given to one party (such as the termination 
of British concessions)—rather than ensure new concessions to other parties (such as 
Russia and the United States)—in order to ensure a balance between super powers that 
conducted foreign relations with Iran. In accordance with this negative equilibrium 
policy, British oil concessions had to end. As Chubin and Zabih noted, Iran’s new 
government believed that “the Soviet danger could be dealt with in the context of the 
Cold War; British influence could not.”38 Mosaddeq believed the only way to decrease 
British economic influence was by nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 
order to achieve this, Prime Minister Mosaddeq put the nationalization of Iranian oil to 
the Majles vote. The bill, the Law of Repossession (khal’-e yad,) was passed by the 
Majles in March 1951. Two days later, Mohammed Reza Shah was thus compelled—
somewhat reluctantly—to sign this into law.39 
These successful nationalist foreign policy implications enacted by Mosaddeq’s 
government undermined not only British economic and political domination, they also 
damaged Russian and American interests in the region. On top of this, the democratic and 
liberalist domestic politics of the Mosaddeq administration in partisan political circles 
generated rising resentments among both the Left, such as the Tudeh, and the Right 
(conservative) political parties. Hence, both external and internal power centers launched 
open as well as hidden political campaigns intending to bring down Mosaddeq’s 
government and eliminate its political force. These power centers, particularly Britain 
                                                 
37 Manoucheh Dorraj and Hamid Zangeneh, “Missed Oppurtunities and Political Blunders: The Tale 
of US-Iran Relations,” in Handbook of US-Middle East Relations: Formative Factors and Regional 
Perspectives, 484-501 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 486. 
38 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley, CA: Uniersity of 
California Press, 1974), 2. 
39 Katouzian, “Mosaddeq's Goverment in Iran History,” 4. 
 18
and the United States, eventually achieved their goals and, in turn, helped to cause the 
collapse of the Mosaddeq regime in August 1953. This incident ended the first phase of 
Iranian foreign policy and initiated a new era in Tehran’s international relations following 
a more pro-Western trajectory. 40 
The overthrow of the Mosaddeq government left a blackdark mark on Iranian 
domestic and international affairs. More than five decades later, the Iranian perception of 
these events continues to have a significant effect on Iran’s international orientation as 
well as on its own domestic issues.41 
C. RESENTMENT OF TO EXTERNAL MEDDLING: THE UNITED STATES 
Between 1906 and 1953, the interactions of the United States and Iran were 
constructive for both sides, especially for Iran. The first considerable contact between the 
two countries occurred via the “Iranian Constitutional Revolution” between 1905 and 
1908. Many Americans, such as Howard Conklin Baskerville, an American teacher in a 
Christian religious school in Tabriz, Iran, who died fighting for Iranian democracy and 
liberalization, supported the constitutionalism and democracy movements in Persia. 
Baskerville’s support and stimulus had a significant impact on materializing the 1906 
revolution. As a result, the first steps towards democratization—the establishment of the 
Majlis and the legalization of electoral system—were made with the help of American 
support to Iran. 
Additionally, the United States played a critical role for Iranians at the end of 
World War II by putting an end to the Russian pressures and interventions imposed on 
Iran. In December 1943, the ‘big three’—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and 
Joseph Stalin—met in Tehran, which resulted in the penning of the Tehran Declaration. 
During this meeting, the three superpower leaders all recognized that the war caused 
unique economic difficulties for Iran. Secondly, these leaders promised to preserve Iran’s 
unity and independence and to promote Iranian development. Third, they also affirmed to 
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withdraw all of their troops from Iran within six months of the end of the war.42 This last 
article also stated in the Potsdam Conference Declaration in 1946: “all Allied troops must 
be withdrawn from Tehran right away.”43 The Russian government, however, violated 
both declarations and acted independently. Immediately after the Potsdam Conference, 
the Soviet press launched a massive campaign against Iran, supporting the creation of 
separate Azerbaijani and Kurdish states.  Russia’s further actions later posed a threat to 
Iranian sovereignty. It then fell to the United States to solve the problem.44 With the help 
of the Truman administration’s deterrent policy against Russia, the Iranian government 
purged Russian troops and the communist ideology out of Iran. Furthermore, the U.S. 
government adhered to the Tehran Declaration established at their original meeting and 
offered $7.8 million in lend-lease assistance to Iran.45 
During World War II, the United States continued assisting Iran. However, 
American’s good intentions—but mixed implementation of political, economical, and 
military aid—created a negative impact on the Iranian people.46 Negative feelings toward 
the U.S. government’s policies increased further when it became known that the U.S. was 
heavily involved in the 1953 overthrow47 of Iran’s democratically elected nationalist 
Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. Mosaddeq had been well known as an elder 
statesman in Iranian politics with a long record of opposing both the Pahlavi Dynasty and 
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change in domestic Iranian politics, the U.S. government’s reputation among Iranians 
became sullied. The United States went in short order from being an ally of Iran to 
Tehran’s enemy.49 
The consequences of the 1953 ‘CIA-supported coup’ changed postwar Iran’s 
situation in several basic ways. First, the United States took the place of the British and 
Russians as the dominant superpower in Iran, becoming the leading foreign power both 
economically and politically in Iran. Secondly, earlier hopes that the United States might 
help in supporting a more democratic government in Iran declined. Third, the pro-
Western Mohammed Reza Shah was increasingly prepared to engage in repressive and 
dictatorial acts. The ‘CIA and Mossad-backed SAVAK’, an Iranian domestic security and 
intelligent service began its repressive operations—including murdering, jailing and 
torturing—quickly becoming a nightmare for the anti-Shah people.50 Last but not least, 
although the Shah showed a growing interest in modernizing Iran’s economy and society, 
especially in the late 1960s to mid-1970s, his desire to have a militarily strong Iran, 
coupled with fewer economic resources, increased Iran’s economic dependence on the 
West and heightened the disparity between Iran’s elite and public.51 The Shah’s 
repressive and autocratic rule and American support for over twenty-five years of the 
Shah’s dictatorship, fuelled anti-Shah and anti-American (government) feelings among 
the public.52 As a result, under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, masses 
of people launched an opposition movement against the Shah and the West. This 
movement ultimately toppled the Shah of Iran in 1979 and established a religious-based, 
xenophobic and aggressive regime in Iran.  
The American hostage crisis in Iran, which had occurred immediately after the 
Islamic Revolution in November 1979, and spurred by Iranian leftist students in 
retaliation for the overthrow of Mosaddeq, was the first spark of the still-unnamed war 
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between the United States and Iran. Many Iranians justified the U.S. embassy’s seizure as 
a rational act. The logic used to validate the act dated back to 1953 and the ensuing five-
plus decades of oppression.53 The embassy seizure served a political purpose and excused 
Iran’s actions as self-defense. As such, given this logic, U.S. retaliation would be 
needless and unprovoked.54 However, Washington’s response was harsh. The Reagan 
administration violated the Algiers Accords, signed by both the United States and Iran on 
January 19, 1981, to resolve the hostage crisis, and imposed economic sanctions on 
Iran—many of which are still in effect—as a response to the U.S. embassy seizure.55 
While this 444-day pivotal episode altered American perceptions and strategies 
toward Iran, the events experienced during and after the 1953 coup had generated even 
greater Iranian opposition against the West and Western ideas.56 Resentment toward U.S. 
foreign policies further increased throughout the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988). Reactions 
toward Saddam Hussein’s September 1980 invasion by the international community were 
unexpected by Iran. The U.S.’ support for Iraq during the war made matters worse. An 
invasion of Iran by Iraq, Tehran believed, would only materialize if prompted and 
encouraged by Washington.57 Consequently, the negative American sentiment in Iran, 
which began with the overthrow of Mosaddeq, gradually increased during the 
Mohammed Shah period and reached its climax throughout the interwar period. 
D. THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON IRANIAN POLITICS: THE 
CONCEPTS OF ITHNA ASHARI SHI’ISM 
Throughout Iran’s history, religion has always been an important part of Iranian 
social and political life. As Limbert noted, “The Achaemenian kings associated 
themselves with the Iranian god Ahura Macda and with the gods of their many subject 
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peoples. In the third century the Sassanians established Zoroastrianism as their state 
religion.”58 However, it was not until the Safavids, in 1501, when a majority of the 
people who lived on the Iranian plateau converted to Ashari Shia Islam, that religious 
ideology played a much greater role in Iranian political and social discourse. From the 
Safavids period to modern-day Iran, Shi’a Islam and its religio-political traditions and 
culture have continuously been the centers of Iranian social and political life and even 
forms individual characteristics such as speech patterns, professional relations and family 
life. 59 
The faith of Shi’a Islam, particularly the concept of leadership (the imamate), the 
concept of the position of a Mujtahid (Islamic scholar), the concept of martyrdom and of 
the legitimate character of self-sacrifice (the Kerbela-motif),60 the doctrine of non-
cooperation with oppression and non-participation in oppressive government as well as 
Islamic unity and brotherhood between Muslims, has been transformed into political 
discourse and activities in Iran. For more than three centuries, these notable doctrines of 
the Shi’a have significantly shaped customary and widespread Iranian beliefs regarding 
their own historical foundations, social structures, cultural norms and political narratives 
and continue to do so this day.  
Characteristics of the Shi’a faith derived from these events include martyrdom, 
self-sacrifice, chivalry, loyalty, faith, return of a savior, elimination of injustices and 
strong devotion to the Prophet’s family, among others. These pieces are only a small part 
of the larger Shi’a story in Iran. However, it is these same pieces that feed the everyday 
lives and discourses of the Iranian people at all levels. Master storytellers, leaders of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, including Ayatollah Khomeini as well as local Friday prayer 
guides, transformed these historical narratives into potent political ideological 
frameworks from which to chronicle new accounts of how Iranian life should be in Iran 
after the Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s. The new political leaders of Iran used 
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symbols in the form of people to motivate the Iranian people. Mohammed Reza Shah, the 
last shah of Iran before the Iranian Revolution, came to symbolize a taghut, a modern-day 
idolatrous pharaoh who rejected Allah’s will and His commands. The Mojaheddin-e 
Khalq, a leftist opposition organization, was denounced as Monafequin. The Monafequin 
was a group in the seventh century who covertly sought to undermine to Prophet’s 
mission, although they pretended to support him along the way. And Saddam Hussein 
became a symbol for the hated Yazid who had killed Imam Husain, the grandson of the 
Prophet Mohammed.61 
Shi’a believes that the twelfth imam—referred to by various names, including the 
Lord of the Age, the Mahdi, and the Hidden Imam, among others—will return to earth at 
the end of the world and transform it from the unjust and corrupt society it had become 
and return justice, harmony and equality to the people. In the same vein of thought, 
Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, appeared to believe strongly in the 
ideology of justice and of fighting against oppressors. Justice was a powerful tenet in not 
only Persian nationalism, but also Islamic jurisprudence and particularly Shi’a faith. 
Khomeini was opposed to despotism, imperialism and corruption. He spoke vehemently 
against monarchical absolutism in Iran and, on a grander scale, against tyranny across the 
Islamic realm, thus appealing not only to his Iranian brothers, but also his Muslim 
counterparts outside Iran’s geographic limits.62 
Khomeini’s attitude toward the West, like many revolutionary Iranian leaders, 
was shaped in large part by his life experiences and encounters with Western 
governments and their unjust policy implementations toward Iran. He observed, over the 
course of his life, Iran’s occupation by foreign governments and militaries, a U.S.-
sponsored military coup in the early 1950s ending Iran’s attempts to reclaim its national 
oil wealth, religious uprisings being crushed in the early 1960s, and ultimately, his own 
expulsion from Iran. Khomeini believed that the Shah was essentially a puppet of the 
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Western powers, in particular the United States.63 Therefore, he devoted his life to fight 
against the “corrupt” and “oppressive” Shah Regime and its prolonged supporter, the 
United States, just like Imam Husain’s revolt against the Omayyad Caliphate of Yazid 
bin Muawiyah.  
The story of Imam Husain, son of Ali and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, 
and his martyrdom at Karbala after the revolt, Yazid continues to be a significant part of 
genuine Shi’a core cultural beliefs and Khomeini’s practices. As such, the 
commemoration of Husain’s martyrdom has remained a constant part of Shi’a religious 
customs for centuries. In the modern era, the story of Imam Husain’s sacrifice has been 
embraced by major political discourses and similar activities.64 
The martyrdom of Imam Husain was believed, by Khomeini, to be more than a 
story of suffering. It was not seen as a mere ritualistic, traditional, annual display, but 
instead as an act of constant defiance and rebellion. Khomeini’s version of the Husain 
story became analogous to Iran’s relationship with the U.S. and U.S. proxies. Husain 
symbolized Iran. The murderer of Iran, figuratively, in this reinterpretation of the 
narrative, became, in essence, the United States and its affiliated supporters.65 
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III. REASSESSING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN’S 
FOREIGN POLICY AND POWER PROJECTION: A THREAT TO 
GLOBAL SECURITY, OR A CHALLENGE TO THE U.S. AND ITS 
ALLIES? 
In this chapter, we will argue that although the Islamic Republic of Iran 
challenges the U.S. national interest in the region, it is not a threat to global security. 
Although the consideration and attention given in scholarly literature toward the extent of 
challenges posed by Iran towards the United States and its allies demonstrates diversity, 
many politicians and scholars, in fact, share parallel ideas regarding four major issues 
including Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its support for particular terrorist organization, its 
efforts to undermine the Middle East peace and Iraqi state-building processes, and finally, 
its efforts to subvert Gulf monarchies.66  
The question of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran—particularly its nuclear 
agenda—actually poses a threat to global security is still a subject of intens debates in the 
literature. Indeed, the debate regarding Iran’s challenges generally emerges from the 
motivations behind Iranian foreign policy-makers and the projected future trends in 
Iranian strategy. Is Iran an ideologically driven irrational state or can it be argued that 
Iran is, in fact, the model of a truly pragmatic rational state? On one hand, by considering 
Iran’s radical Islamic transformation since the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, and by 
emphasizing its desire to export revolutionary ideas via irrational methods—such as 
supporting insurgency groups and trying to subvert Gulf monarchies—as well as regime 
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territorial claims in the Persian Gulf neighborhood, some experts assert that Iran has an 
ideologically driven and expansionist foreign agenda. Therefore, they consider Iran to be 
a threat to global security.67  
Along the same thought vein, some scholars maintain it is clerical factionalism 
coupled with the messianic appearance of Tehran’s Shi’a ideological framework that 
ensures Iranian and affiliated religious leaders are unaffected by and almost protected 
from the traditional international acceptable norms.68 
Charles Krauthammner, for instance, claims, “Iran and its nuclear program pose a 
life-or-death threat to Israel.” By emphasizing Tehran’s anti-Semitic rhetoric—essentially 
its call for Israel to be wiped off the map—and by characterizing Iran’s President, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as an irrational leader who believes in the messianic return and 
the coming of the apocalypse in the not-too-distant future, Krauthammner asserts that 
“Iran is very difficult to deter with threat of retaliation, since its leaders may see a nuclear 
war as helping to hasten the end and to bring the Islamic messiah back more quickly.”69 
For this reason, according to Krauthammner, Iran’s nuclear agenda is a serious challenge 
to global security and Iran should be prevented from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
On the other hand, although successes of the  supreme leader of Islamic 
Revolution, Ruhollah Moosavi Khomeini, can find their foundational cornerstones in 
Shi’ite dogma and traditions, along with the widespread and far-reaching institutional 
religious presence throughout Iran70, many scholars argue that Iran’s foreign policy, 
particularly over the last two decades, is not simply a matter of religious ideology (to 
export revolution,) but also of internal domestic—to ensure survival of the regime—and 
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international external variables—to impede foreign meddling and attack.71 For example, 
according to R.K Ramazani, a more detailed, comprehensive analysis of Iranian rhetoric 
and actions crystallizes the fact that Tehran’s foreign policy is solidly built upon the 
demonstrated interface of both domestic issues, beyond simple factional politics, and the 
external actors and influences inherent in the international environment that have 
deliberate and sometimes unintended consequences shapes Iranian foreign policymakers’ 
decisions.72 
 According to adherents of this claim, Iran is, in fact, not the international 
anomaly many attempt to paint it. Iran’s decision makers, much like the United States 
and other influential world players in the global arena, have adopted and implemented a 
realpolitik framework since Khomeini’s death. Similar to many other nations, Iran’s 
decisions are seen by contemporary scholars as a matter of pragmatic responses to the 
newly emerging global system and the threats therein. Even more recent interpretations 
of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, for example, are viewed as pragmatic, practical reactions that 
aid it with facilitating typical national security goals, such as regime maintenance and 
survival, as well as nuclear deterrence and a demonstrated ability to protect itself if 
necessary.73 
Chapter III, therefore, addresses the domestic and foreign policy drivers of Iran 
from the onset of the Islamic Republic. This chapter also analyzes Iranian worldviews 
and affiliated threat perceptions, emphasizing the associated pragmatic ideological 
structures. The latter portion of this chapter underscores the preeminent themes 
interwoven throughout Iranian regional strategy. Four key tenets include deterrence, pan-
Islamism, proxy group support, and solicitation of and appeal to a pan-Arab populace’s 
public opinion. At first blush, this may seem ideologically driven and expansionist; 
however, when viewed through a different lens, these themes underline a broad-based, 
layered homeland defense strategy. 
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A. THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF THE IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY—
FROM RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY TO PRAGMATISM 
Similar to many other countries, interlinked external and internal values, such as 
cultural, national and historical elements as well as economic interests, determine Iran’s 
foreign policy. Generally, Iran’s foreign policy merges and unites various pieces of 
religious nationalism and politico-economic pragmatism to forward and pursue Iranian 
national interests.74  
As described in a Rand Corporation (2009) study, the Islamic government’s 
foreign policy, in general, was not built only on religious ideology and/or expansionism; 
pragmatism, factionalism and deterrence constitute major premises of the Republic’s 
foreign and domestic decision-making progress. According to this study “Iranian 
behavior has been characterized by realpolitic. […] Iran’s nuclear ambitious and even its 
support for terrorism is seen as serving more-pragmatic goals related to regime survival 
and deterrence.”75 In this context, the latter part of this chapter analyses the 
transformation of Tehran’s foreign and domestic politics—from ideology-based dogmas 
to pragmatic, national interest-based realpolitic—considered from a historical frame of 
reference. 
1. Ayatollah Khomeini and a Religious Ideology-Based Foreign Policy 
When Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan, a leader often characterized as 
secular, nationalist, and democratic, as the provisional prime minister of the Islamic 
Republic on February 5, 1979, the first priority of his government was to terminate the 
subservient de facto alliance of the shah’s regime with the United States and, in short, 
place the relations of the two countries on a plane of “equality.” Bazargan adopted a 
nonalignment policy on the basis of “equilibrium” aimed at maintaining Iran’s 
independence vis-à-vis the United States and other great powers. Bazargan maintained 
that his movement, the Iran Liberation Front, was a bridge between the secular National 
Front and the religious movement led by Khomeini. However, the seizure of the U.S. 
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embassy on November 4, 1979, and the 444-day hostage dispute set the stage for a new, 
idealistic revolutionary foreign policy setting Iran against the rest of the world, and 
causing resentment and isolation toward Iran. Khomeini’s new, idealistic revolutionary 
foreign policy (religious ideology) challenged and confronted Bazargan’s liberal 
movement. Therefore, Bazargan and his ministers resigned by Khomeini in November 
1979, following the U.S. hostage crisis. The end of the Bazargan administration 
diminished hopes and opportunities for the creation of a liberal democracy in Iran 
decreased.76 
Khomeini’s endorsement of the U.S. embassy seizure, in essence, became the 
cornerstone and set the tone and future foundation for the isolated and xenophobic 
foreign policy of Iran. Khomeini’s overriding goal, in terms of domestic politics, was to 
form a state governed by Islamic norms—a faqih-ruled Iran—whose ultimate aim was to 
export the ‘Islamic Revolution’ to the rest of the world. According to Khomeini, “Islam is 
not peculiar to a country, even the Muslims. Islam comes for humanity. Islam wishes to 
bring all humanity under the umbrella of justice.”77 Moreover, Khomeini believed 
monarchies should not exist and are against Allah’s (God’s) wishes due to their injustice 
and oppressive ruling system. “We have no choice but to destroy those systems that are 
corrupt and to overthrow all oppressive and criminal regimes,”78 affirmed Khomeini. As 
a result of Khomeini’s confrontational foreign policy, Iran was left with only one major 
ally remaining in the Middle East, Syria. All other Middle Eastern countries perceived 
Iran’s crusade to export the Islamic Revolution as a threat to their own national interests. 
Moreover, Khomeini’s expansionist strategy, coupled with Iran’s proxy groups’ anti-
Western demonstrations, and militant activities, such as the suicide bombings of the U.S. 
and French forces in Lebanon in 1983, and the holding of American, British, French, and 
German hostages in Lebanon, further isolated the Islamic Republic. Iran’s idealistic 
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confrontational foreign policy even undermined Iran’s relations with Soviet Russia. As a 
result, Moscow cut economic ties with Iran. Notably, however, the economic relations of 
Iran with Soviet Russia did not improve until 1986.79 
Within the first decade after the Islamic Revolution, Iran staged a confrontation 
between the revolutionary realists, who supported nationalistic, pragmatic ideas, and the 
revolutionary idealists, who aimed to override religious norms in state affairs. 
Khomeini’s foreign policy illustrated ideas of both the realists and idealists, although 
religious-based policies dominated Iranian affairs until his death. 
2. The Reformist Movement and the Rise of Hardliners 
Iran’s isolation from the world and its economic situation required a reorientation 
toward a more realistic and reformist foreign policy after Khomeini’s death in 1989. 
Iran’s foreign policy in the 1990s signified a decided transformation from Khomeini’s 
revolutionary ideologies toward more practical national interests. This approach, in the 
last decade of the twentieth century, was deemed necessary to secure Iranian national 
interests in a world that had changed significantly, especially in the past decade.80 
The changing priorities of Iran’s internal and international policies, from 
revolutionary radicalism to pragmatic power politics, can be better understood by 
considering the combination of the destructive effects of the Iran-Iraq War along with the 
insecurity of Iran’s isolation by international actors.81 The prolonged war against Iraq and 
the economic isolation of Iran, coupled with a dramatic drop in oil revenues through the 
end of the 1980s, resulted in mounting economic hardships that drove Iran into a social 
and economic deadlock. In the post-war period, realistic ideas and political pragmatism 
gained increasing importance, particularly during the presidency of “conservative 
pragmatist” Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and “reformist” Mohammad Khatami. 
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Reconstructing ties became central to Rafsanjani after continued stress and the 
decline of Iran’s international reputation during the Iran-Iraq war under Khomeini. Re-
forging ties among Arab neighbors and the newly emerging states of Central Asia, 
including Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, topped Tehran’s political priority 
list.  Additionally, throughout his presidency from 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani attempted to 
avoid clashes with the United States and other Western powers. Rafsanjani, who 
advocated a free-market economy in Iran, struggled to rebuild the war-torn Iranian 
economy and political structure by pursuing liberal economic rules and good economic 
relations with the West. 
In the period between 1997 and 2005, the successor of Rafsanjani, President 
Muhammad Khatami, launched a comprehensive revision of Iran’s foreign policy, which 
no other period of the Islamic Republic had experienced. The goal of the Khatami 
administration was to lift “the walls of mistrust,” which had been built between Iran and 
many Arab states and European countries, despite the natural pull of religious ideology in 
the Iranian politics, which impeded Khatami’s tendencies toward realism. Although 
Khatami’s presidency failed to achieve his goals and lacked ultimate success, his 
achievements proved momentous internationally. The essence of his reform movement 
was that democratic accountability at home directed a foreign policy, which respected 
current norms in the international arena. Khatami’s mantra, “Dialogue among 
Civilizations,” was not simply a catchphrase, but rather a genuine belief that détente and 
cooperation were the best strategies by which to legitimize their rule. Furthermore, during 
this time, Iran finally achieved a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and reclaimed its ties 
with the European Union. For a brief moment in time, it appeared Iran was finally willing 
to relinquish its revolutionary past and join the international community as a cooperative 
partner on the world stage.82 
Impressively, Khatami’s presidency and his policies overcame conservative 
resistance despite U.S. hostilities. Hard-liners who command key agencies of the state 
worked diligently to subvert Khatami’s moderate policies by accusing his administration 
                                                 
82 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 5. 
 32
of being an agent of the Unites States. Simultaneously, Washington, unused to real, 
lasting changes in Iran, did not understand the actual scope of Khatami’s promise. 
Instead, Washington’s punitive policies toward Iran remained unchanged and sanctions 
and isolation policies remained in place, which, in effect, proved counterproductive in the 
long run. A policy with more vision, invention and ingenuity by the U.S. could 
potentially have altered Iran’s domestic balance of power favoring the reformers.83 
In fact, two major events—9/11 and the nuclear crisis—helped breathe new life 
into and revive the hardliners’ platform and energized the momentum behind their 
campaign. Washington’s insistent and consistent animosity toward Tehran in effect paved 
the way, facilitating the conservative members’ ability to malign the reformers by 
insinuating the reformers were allegedly supporting and enabling U.S. regime change 
goals for Iran. The international community’s decision to deal with Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions via sanctions and external pressures in actuality empowered conservatives, 
who gained much from this conflict. The reformers then, overwhelmed and exhausted 
from dealing with domestic political battering and U.S. animosity, would surrender to the 
rising power of the hardliners.84 The rise of the new right portended important changes in 
Iran’s foreign affairs. A mixture of Islamist ideology and ultranationalism would 
condition the new rulers’ perspective. 
B. IRAN’S CURRENT STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND FOREIGN POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has described itself as a major actor for global 
Islamic enlightenment. Religious ideologues have often declared pan-Islamic posturing 
since the Islamic Revolution. These religious beliefs were often also translated into 
foreign policy and had religious-political implications and ramifications. However, 
Tehran today, is highly aware that no country can survive by persisting in ideologically-
based policies alone. Tehran is also aware that the government has to manage its 
economy and meet the demands of a growing population. It does not mean that Tehran 
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has completely abandoned Khomeini’s legacy, which is still retained in Iranian foreign 
policy. However, Tehran’s more immediate goals are, rather than be an Islamic 
forerunner, to emerge as a hegemonic actor in the Middle East, to ensure regime survival 
and to lift economic and political isolation by means of more pragmatic and practical 
strategies. These three aspirations are perhaps realistic, though not necessarily 
revolutionary ideals. These aims, in essence, are intertwined, and Iran’s policies are quite 
hermetic due to its factionalist structure. In the context of this political turbulence, Iran’s 
political priorities and the courses of actions it chooses in order to materialize these 
objectives are considered further in the following section. 
1. Regional and Global Preeminence 
Iranian leadership, including the Pahlavi Dynasty, has traditionally perceived 
itself as the regional hegemonic power because of Iran’s geographic size and its historical 
accomplishments and successes. The government and leadership of the more nascent 
Islamic Republic of Iran was no exception. In the early period of the Islamic Republic, 
Khomeini employed revolutionary radicalism in order to achieve and realize this 
prolonged desire. Khomeini’s selected course of action was to spread his ideology under 
the banner of, “Neither West nor East but Islam” and to create a faqih-ruled Middle East 
under the spiritual leadership of the Islamic Republic. However, his objective, a faqih-
ruled world, stayed within the boundaries of Iran. Moreover, some of Khomeini’s 
aggressive foreign policies, including the use of terrorism and the subversion of some 
Persian Gulf monarchies (many of which were U.S. allies,) provided the foundation for 
and sped up the process towards Iran’s economic and political isolation and negated its 
intended goal of becoming a global power.85   
Iranian leaders still look for ways to dominate the region and play more active 
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of using violence to radically reshape the region or attempting to undermine regimes, a 
greater emphasis on diplomatic measures and state-to-state dialogue has been employed 
by Iranian officials.86  
Tehran’s struggle to attain regional hegemonic power status has been impacted, 
perhaps unintentionally, by the U.S.’s objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban regimes (two of Iran’s sworn adversaries.) 
These transitions, often sudden, were predicted to essentially leave a regional power 
vacuum with the anticipated departure of U.S. troops from these two countries, which 
Iran planned to use to its advantage. The current Iranian administration, therefore, seeks 
to encourage the reduction of U.S. troops and influence in the region and to fill itself, the 
political power vacuum, which many anticipate will remain. 
2. Regime Survival 
The foremost priority of Tehran today is to preserve regime survival. 
Independence from the West, particularly from the influence of the United States, 
constitutes one of the leading objectives of Iranian leaders. The fear of external plots is 
particularly prevalent within the Iranian political structure and is of concern among 
Iranian elite and intelligentsia. This is predominantly due in large part to the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service’s (MI6) 
collective efforts toward overthrowing the democratically-elected Iranian nationalist 
Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. 
Iranian leaders see a confluence, and often merging of, internal and external 
threats. In order to sustain legitimacy, Tehran—likewise all revolutionary regimes—often 
maintains a conspiracy theorist laden viewpoint in which the regime believes others 
target them deliberately, knowingly and willfully. As such, the current political and 
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great powers. When their public support begins to falter, Iranian leaders purposefully 
exploit public opinion by fomenting paranoia in order to reaffirm their regime’s 
legitimacy.87 
3. Overcoming Economic and Political Isolation 
Another objective of Tehran, today, is to overcome the West’s, particularly the 
U.S.’s, political and economic isolation. From Iran’s perspective, reducing Western/U.S. 
pressure on Iran has great importance not only for regime survival, but also for national 
economic interests and the preservation of Iranian sovereignty. The Ahmedinejad 
government’s effort to solidify political and economic ties with Asian countries is an 
attempt to compensate its disordered relationships with the West. For example, Iran has 
increasingly vied to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO).88 
As a means to counterbalance the West and restructure political alliances and the 
overall balance of power, Iran—using the U.S.’s Iraq occupation as its proverbial bait—is 
attempting to gain closer diplomatic ties with emerging powers such as Russia and China. 
Should Iran successfully forge positive alliances with these two countries, the strategic 
aims would be to counter potential encirclement by the West and the Arab world. This 
reflects a diplomatic re-orientation in Iran’s foreign policy since President 
Ahmendinejad’s rise to power. Iran’s push for full-member status in the SCO is tailored 
and crafted intentionally to counterbalance the Western security presence and hegemony 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).89 
C. THE KEY PREMISES OF IRAN’S POWER PROJECTIONS: WHY DOES 
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC SUPPORT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS? 
In the turbulence of Iranian politics, exercising terrorism as a means of political 
explanation is not a new phenomenon since the Islamic Revolution. “Violence was not 
only a permissible but also a mandatory response against those seeking to undermine 
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God’s republic,” Takeyh states in his book.90 The Ahmedinejad administration, as did its 
predecessor, promotes paramilitary activities and employs terrorism to achieve the 
Islamic Republic’s strategic objectives.  
There are several reasons that can explain Iran’s support for militant groups. 
These reasons may be seen as a part of the Islamic Republic’s power projection, as a 
means to gain Arab public sympathy, and as a way to reduce U.S. influence and exert 
pressure on unfriendly regimes in the region. State-centric geopolitical objectives are 
central to Iran’s support of terrorism and insurgent groups, especially in the Levant. Iran 
purposefully and intentionally exploits the Arab-Israeli dispute in the hopes of creating 
dissonance and dividing the U.S. from its U.S.-friendly Arab regimes. This wedge would 
ideally, effectively generate a pseudo-forward defense posture and help provide insurance 
against a potential U.S. invasion of Iran.91 
The Islamic Republic’s support for Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and 
Hamas, for instance, provides the Iranian regime with great dividends with its Arab 
brethren. Iran’s support of these terrorist organizations buys Iran significant figurative 
legitimacy and credibility with the Arab community writ large, many of whom are 
dissatisfied with what they consider a complacent, status quo ideological operational 
framework by their largely authoritarian, gerontocratic regimes.92 
Tehran uses terrorist organizations as a driving force for political influence. These 
organizations and paramilitaries can effect and wield significant pressure on regional 
governments that are not sympathetic to Iranian interests at crucial junctures. Perhaps of 
even greater import, however, is that Tehran’s support of these terrorist organizations 
provides Iran with a response capacity aimed at countering U.S. and U.S.-allied regimes 
in its neighborhood, should the need arise.  
 
                                                 
90 Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 225. 
91 Frederic Wehrey, et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent, 7-8. 
92 Ibid., 81.  
 37
Iran’s military support of Shi’ite militants serves as yet another important 
strategic foreign policy aim. While not aiming to necessarily generate a civil war in the 
region, Iran intentionally exploits sectarian strife between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis. By 
empowering, militarily, the local Shi’ites against a perceived threat of the Sunni radicals 
and militias, Iran intends to undermine the influence and expansion of the Sunni Arab, 
purposefully attempting to block Saudi Arabia from gaining a political stronghold as a 
regional leading actor.93 
Iran’s Islamic regime also attempts to undermine the U.S. state-building efforts in 
Iraq by providing financial and technical assistance as well as spiritual guidance to 
Shi’ite insurgency groups in Iraq.94 Iraq remains a central concern to Iran and is an 
important part of Tehran’s foreign policy as it relates to Iranian economic national 
interests. Critical waterways constitute Iran’s most direct link to the international 
petroleum market and is the lifeblood of its economy. As such, Iran seeks to dominate or 
at least maintain a voice in Iraqi political affairs with the assistance from, and the Iranian 
political manipulation of, the Shi’a society in Iraq. 
Tehran’s desire to acquire nuclear power constitutes another important component 
of Iran’s power projection, deterrence and retaliatory strategy. Should Iran obtain a 
sovereign, independent nuclear deterrent capability, to Iranian leadership, this holds 
much significance. Iran believes that with this nuclear capacity, it would not be 
dominated nor threatened by U.S. conventional military forces. Therefore, Iran could 
then continue, in earnest, their efforts to end U.S. presence in the Gulf region via the use 
of militant activities. 
D. MISREADING IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 
The difference between Iranian rhetoric and the reality of their political decisions 
and policies should be more deeply considered. To some, Iran’s policy-makers seem to 
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communicate policy via religious rhetoric. In reality, however, their decisions find much 
logic and are tightly linked with Iran’s pragmatic national interests. In short, Iran’s 
policymakers are not making decisions in what some may consider a religious vacuum, 
nor are the decisions founded on what some associate with irrational, religious beliefs.  
Numerous examples demonstrate the practicality underlining the Iranian decision-
making process. For example, rather than take a religious stance and support the Muslim 
Republic of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Christian Armenia, Tehran found it in its own 
best interests to support Armenia. Iran’s support for Armenia was crafted purposefully 
with the intent to reduce Turkey’s growing influence and political strong-hold in the 
Central Asian arena, an area where Iran has much to lose.   
Additionally, Iran’s maintenance of neutrality in key conflicts also speaks 
volumes toward the pragmatism underscoring their foreign policy decisions. Iran elected 
to retain a neutral posture rather than support their Muslim counterparts in the war 
between Christian Russia and Muslim Chechnya. Maintaining good relations with Russia 
remained high on Iran’s priority list. Another example of Iran’s pragmatic international 
orientation can be observed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Here, again, Iran maintained a 
neutral political disposition although Iraqi Muslims were in conflict with largely 
Christian military forces. Shifting relations with key regional partners have also drifted 
toward a more realpolitic demeanor. Iran’s relations have thawed more recently, for 
example, with Saudi Arabia, after more than twenty years of harsh ideological and 
regional clashes with the Kingdom, whom it has now almost befriended.95 
Iran’s role in the international economic arena also shines a light on key decision 
points where pragmatic realities overtly override religious rhetoric. In 1996, for example, 
Iran offered to sign a $1 billion oil contract with U.S. oil company, Conoco. Iran made 
this offer with the intention of opening dialogue with America, since relations between 
the two countries had been extraordinarily tense since the Islamic Revolution. However, 
this practical attempt at a would-be peace offering and partnership was thwarted with 
U.S. government pressure placed on Conoco to reject the deal. In lieu of Conoco, Iran 
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instead signed with a French oil corporation, Total. These examples specifically 
demonstrate Iran’s political tendencies toward catering to national interests instead of 
simply religious rhetoric. In fact, in 1988, the founding leader of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, arguably one of the most religious-oriented leaders, Ayatollah Khomeini 
demonstrated the growing political pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy in his public 
statement that “our government has priority over all Islamic tenets, even over prayer, 
fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca.”96 
As a result of significant miscalculations regarding Iran’s political baseline and 
intentions, U.S. foreign policy toward Iran has been flawed. This policy toward Iran 
assumes that Iran arrives at its decisions largely as a result of religious means, when in 
fact, the reality is that Iranian foreign policy decision makers’ choices are largely founded 
in practical national interests and rational thought rather than some “mad mullahs” 
making decisions via religious doctrine. Since 1997, when Iranian President Khatami was 
elected as a reformer who was interested in better relations with the U.S., Washington has 
altered its basic picture of rigidity toward Iran, although its overall fundamental approach 
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IV. THE UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD IRAN 
The prolonged Iranian question is, arguably, one of the most salient foreign policy 
issues topping the United States’ agendas today. What is Iran’s overall significance to the 
United States? First, although Iran is not a threat for global security (as argued in the 
previous chapter), Tehran’s power projection, including nuclear enrichment and support 
for militant groups, as well as its regional ambitions and its traditional inclination to 
wield regional dominance, defy the United States and its allies in the region as well as 
undermine the Middle East peace process.98 Second, Iran’s central and geostrategic 
location between countries—including Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, the Caucasus 
and the more recently created Central Asia nations—as well as its enormous continental 
shelf possession in the Persian Gulf make Iran strategically significant for the United 
States’ in terms of protecting its national interest in the region and its ultimate successes 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, considering the growing importance of the Persian Gulf 
in the world oil market, Iran’s significant oil and natural gas reserves—the second largest 
in the world—mark it as a country of immense strategic importance to the U.S.’s 
economic and regional interests.  
Undoubtedly, creating a more pro-Western—particularly pro-American (similar 
to the Pahlavi Dynasty period in Iran)—Iran which plays a significant role in protecting 
Western interests in the Gulf, or at the very least, forming an Iran that is less menacing to 
U.S. interests appears to frequently be a priority objective of many U.S. foreign policy 
administrators.  
Since the Islamic Revolution, addressing the issue of Iran and the challenge it has 
continued to pose has been at the crux of numerous policy shifts. Different approaches to 
deal with the “Iranian problem” have been attempted, seemingly without much success or 
coming close to the achievement of desired U.S. goals. The last three decades of U.S. 
foreign policies towards Iran—the intense economic sanctions and political pressure, 
containment, intimidation and rogue-state rollback—have neither altered the Iranian 
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authority’s aggressive diplomacy nor achieved regime change. Instead, these foreign 
policy choices, by arousing nationalist sentiment and revealing a collective sense of 
discontentment toward American policy among many Iranians, have actually facilitated 
hardliners in gaining public support. Furthermore, these same policies have also 
adversely affected U.S. domestic and international political and economic interests.  
In his book Confronting Iran, Ali Ansari, summarizes the failure of sequential 
U.S. administrations dealing with Iran and the unintentional consequences of these 
failures. Ansari calls attention to the “sobering fact that every American President since 
Islamic revolution has been unable to deal successfully with the question of Iran.”99 He 
states that President Carter was arguably the most high-visibility causalty of the 
interfaces between the United States and Iran. It is widely believed that the result of the 
Iran hostage crisis from 1971–1981 contributed significantly to his and the Democrats’ 
loss of the presidential elections in 1981 to the Republican Party. The Iran-Contra affair 
erupted in the mid-1980s, plaguing President Reagan’s administration. The deals 
brokered during what later became a massive scandal were originally intended to promote 
positive relations between the United States and Iran. However, those efforts failed once 
public light was shed on secret dealings, which ultimately became publicized as arms-for 
hostage scheme, again, not the original intentions of those who initiated the secret plan.  
Allegedly clandestine deals with Iran tainted the George H.W. Bush 
administration as well. When Clinton was elected U.S. President in 1993 and the 
Democrats were once again at the country’s political helm, his original plan of attack was 
simple avoidance of Iran. However, this failed. Iran would not and could not be 
disregarded from the political landscape. During Clinton’s first term, decisions were 
forced to be made that pulled him closer to center stage vis-à-vis the Iranian question. 
The United States’ policies toward Iran became part of the ensuing elections. Throughout 
Clinton’s second term as U.S. president, his interface with Iran increased. However, by 
the end of four years, no significant progress could be determined in dealings with Iran. 
With the pendulum swinging back across the political spectrum to the Republican Party, 
                                                 
99 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 2. 
 43
and George W. Bush’s ascendency to the presidency and the aftermath of 9/11, 
neglecting Iran has not been an option. However, no replacement policy toward Iran has 
yet been formally established.100 
A. U.S. POLICY FAILURES IN IRAN SINCE THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
The major challenge dealing with the Iranian question has been the mutual 
mistrust and undiplomatic discourse that has typified United States-Iranian relations since 
the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Islamic revolution also marked the beginning 
of deadlock and hostility between the two parties, which never lost its vehemence over 
three decades. Successive U.S. administration officials’ characterizations of Iran as a 
‘rogue’ state and their allegations regarding Iran’s efforts to acquire WMD and 
promotion of terrorism worldwide, coupled with the Iranian regime’s insolent response 
toward the U.S. as a retaliatory measure, have comprised some for major reasons of 
rising animosity between these two nations.101 These factors, which are the source of 
mutual hostility between both countries, have also constituted the main determinatives of 
U.S. and Iran foreign policies, priorities and objectives in the region. 
According to Ansari, the main reason for successive U.S. failures in Iran is that 
the United States, after more than three decades, still lacks a coherent, sound, sustainable 
foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic.102 Iran’s overall strategic value and 
significance in the global community writ large as a key player in global stability and 
economic interests makes this U.S. policy vacuum rather remarkable. 
Another reason U.S. foreign policy has consistently been unsuccessful with Iran is 
because the Iranian people have viewed U.S. policies as a threat to their national dignity. 
This perception increased the support of Iranian hardliners and reduced the influence of 
reformers in the country, which was incompatible with U.S. foreign policies. Iranians 
perceived the U.S. as a threat to its nation in several basic ways. First, overall strategies 
of the U.S. in the Middle East have been designed around controlling Middle East oil 
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resources and oil transportation routes. The importance of oil is not only about the profits, 
which would be yielded to oil companies and their countries; it is also about the global 
power garnered by those who control the oil. Iran has the third largest oil reserve in the 
world after Saudi Arabia and Iraq. In 1979, the U.S. and British oil companies owned the 
most Iranian oil. With the 1979 Islamic revolution, however, the U.S. oil companies were 
thrown out of Iran. The probability of a U.S. attack on Iran in order to regain control of 
Iranian oil has been perceived as a threat by the Iranian people. This perception is mainly 
because of neo-con strategies implemented by the U.S. administration in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the wake of September 11. 
Second, similar accusations ascribed to Iraq, such as the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, the nuclear ambitions of leaders and support for terrorism, were 
directed toward Iran. These reproaches have generated skepticism toward future U.S. 
strategies and policies on Iran. Furthermore, neither the Bush nor the Obama 
administrations, has ever abandoned a military operation option against Iran as a choice 
of deterrence. President Barack Obama’s administration stated, “the United States 
reserved all its options, ranging from diplomacy to military action, to pressure Iran over 
its nuclear program. […] We must use all elements of our national power to protect our 
interests as it relates to Iran.”103 
Third, the Iranian state has been the only Shi’a Muslim state in the region and this 
particular characteristic of Iran has had a tremendous impact on U.S.–Iran relations. Most 
of the world’s petroleum is in the Shi’a parts of the Middle East including Iraq (60 
percent Shi’a), Iran (93 percent Shi’a) and the Shi’a part of the Saudi Arabia. The current 
Iranian administration wants to be a regional superpower. In order to materialize its goal, 
one of its strategies is the formation of the independent “Shi’a alliance” controlling most 
of the world’s oil specifically under the umbrella of the “Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization.” In the event of this formation, U.S. interests in the region would be 
undermined. The U.S. administration would most likely employ more severe measures to 
prevent it from the possibility of losing control of the world’s oil. 
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All such threat perceptions of the United States by the Iranian people are, in 
actuality, greatly assisted Ahmadinejad and his hardline government and conservative 
supporters, while contributing to U.S. policy failures in Iran. Independent, reformist, and 
democratic movements, as well as oppositional movements, were considered agents and 
servant policies of the U.S. and other external powers. Furthermore, reformist movements 
were restricted and suppressed by hardliners. The constant pressure on the reformists and 
their oppression by the hardliners prevented them from organizing and confronting 
Ahmadinejad and his supporters more effectively.104 
B. A QUICK GLANCE AT OVERALL U.S. STRATEGIES IN THE REGION 
In scholarly literature, criticisms regarding overall U.S. foreign policy generally 
focus on the post-Cold War era and newer American foreign policies toward Iran, namely 
“American militarism”, the “dual-containment policy” and the “rogue state doctrine.”105 
1. American Militarism 
During the 1980s and 1990s, from the Carter through the George W. Bush 
administrations, the U.S.’ defense and foreign policy gained a ‘unipolar’ identity giving 
the United States the opportunity to reshape the world system to its advantage.106 
Furthermore, under George W. Bush, the unipolar American strategy shifted from 
hegemonic economic governance to militarism, or the pursuit of global hegemony by 
means of military force.107 
In order to achieve global hegemony and sustain economic stability at home, the 
energy-rich Persian Gulf has been implicitly assumed to be the first prerequisite by 
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several successions of U.S. administrations, both republican and democratic.108 In order 
to assure this prerequisite, U.S. administrations opted for military mobilization as the 
preferred means. Flip S. Golub presents a solid brief of U.S. military intervention 
progresses in the oil-rich regions: “The U.S. armed forces have swept across Central Asia 
and the Gulf, occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, and established a dense new network of 
forward military bases in the strategically sensitive arc stretching from the Gulf to South 
Asia. At the same time, far from that central theater of operations, hence far from 
scrutiny, covert military and intelligence operations have been launched.”109  
Rising U.S. militarism in the neighborhood of energy-rich Iran, the Bush doctrine 
of preemptive military action against emergent threat states (such as Iran), and keeping 
military options on the table generated perceptions of an American threat among 
Iranians.110 This perception has played a significant role in shaping Iranian decisions in 
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2. The Rogue State Doctrine and Dual-Containment Policies 
The George H. W. Bush administration used a rogue state doctrine in order to 
meet the immediate and persistent threat represented by aggressive rogue states, although 
the assumption of rogue state aggressiveness, whether justified or not, is still a 
controversial subject in the literature.112 
As a consequence of rogue state doctrine, the Clinton administration implemented 
a dual-containment policy pursuing a strategy that sought to isolate Iran, in part by 
attempting to limit all third-party assistance to the country.113 Restrictions were tightened 
in 1995 along with the implementation of the Iran Sanction Act (ISA), originally called 
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).114  
In addition to American militarism, two U.S. foreign policies—the rogue state 
doctrine and the dual containment policy—have fueled Iranians’ fierce nationalism, 
characterized by intense suspicions and absolute resentment of foreign influences.115 Not 
only ‘conservatives’ but also ‘reformers’ have perceived American foreign policies as 
meddling with Iranian interior affairs. Hence, governments that pursue anti-American 
policies, gain high levels of national support, while pro-American governments fail to 
achieve success even though they follow a more democratic and reformist road. Jahangir 
Amuzegar’s illustration regarding the rise of Khomeini clearly presents this resentment: 
“Ayatollah Khomeini climbed to the Peacock Throne not on the wings of Quranic angels 
but mainly by championing freedom from U.S. interference.”116 
In this context, the latter part of this chapter will focus on six successive U.S. 
administrations,’ from Carter to Obama, and their respective policies and strategies 
toward the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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C. THE JIMMY CARTER ADMINISTRATION (JANUARY 1977 TO 1981) 
While respect for human rights and human dignity constituted the key premises of 
the Carter administration’s domestic and foreign policies, the implication of these 
policies illustrated that Iran was out of the Carter administration’s scope. Ansari 
emphasizes this point: “Carter’s determination to make human rights a central pillar of 
his foreign policy had scarcely been applied to Iran.”117 In the same vein of thought, 
Dorraj and Zageneh note that the Carter administration was “torn between the ideals of 
America—respect for human rights and human dignity—and the reality of American 
political and economic interest—thus bowing to the military—industrial complex and 
approving increasingly more military hardware and assistance to the Shah’s regime.”118  
The Carter administration was the major supporter of Iran’s Shah, whose desire 
was to establish an all-powerful regional security and defense capability that emanated 
from Iran and extended outwards to its Middle Eastern neighborhood. Attempting to 
create this massive a military and security force, however, proved costly, and adversely 
impacted Iran’s economy significantly. Additionally, during the Carter administration, 
much like previous U.S. administrations’ activities, the CIA provided support, training 
and equipment to the Shah’s secret service—SAVAK—an organization infamously 
known for brutalities and the oppression of Iranian peoples, particularly those of the 
revolutionary vanguard opposing the Shah.119  
From an Iranian perspective, scholars Yazdani and Rizwan both criticized the 
post-Shah period of the Carter administration’s foreign policy implications toward the 
newly established Islamic Republic. According to these scholars, the major factor behind 
the U.S. embassy seizure and the hostage crisis in 1980 was the Carter administration’s 
Iranian strategy: “The United States kept on interfering in Iran’s internal affairs even 
after the fall of the Shah, which was one of the major factors for the seizure of the U.S. 
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embassy in Tehran by students opposed to such interference.”120 As such, the U.S. 
embassy seizure was ultimately viewed by politicians and Iranian leadership as 
“preemptive self-defense” countering external actors’ meddling into Iranian affairs, and 
as such, in the minds of Iranians, should not warrant U.S. retaliation.  
As a result of the U.S. embassy seizure in 1980, the United States severed 
relations with Iran. The U.S. retaliatory measures included freezing U.S.-based Iranian 
assets and restricting travel from Iran to the United States via visa cancellations and 
economic sanctions. Attempts to undermine the government of Iran by the United States 
continued and were geared toward regime change. In order to facilitate this aim and to 
orchestrate a pro-Western coup, the United States communicated with opposition 
members in Iran, including former high-ranking military officials like General Glulam 
Ali Oveisi and the Shah regime’s last Prime Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar.121 
The consequences of the Carter administration’s lack of decisiveness post-1979 
resulted in ever-increasing challenges for Washington-Tehran relations. Iran’s hostage-
taking—as well as the United States’ failed hostage-rescue attempts, such as economic 
sanctions—fueled nationalist sentiments short-term in Iran, and as such, became a 
profitable, useful means for the Tehran government to solidify their legitimacy, whose 
ultimate goal was to establish a theocracy by centralizing the power of the clergy. The 
outcome of this tit-for-tat diplomacy increased tensions and made interfaces between the 
two governments practically unmanageable.122 
D. THE RONALD REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (JANUARY 1981 TO 1989) 
On April 7, 1980, immediately after the unsuccessful militarily hostage rescue 
attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, Washington severed diplomatic dealings with Tehran. 
The Carter administration’s diplomacy, pressure, isolation, and military efforts directed at 
resolving the hostage crisis ultimately failed. However, the hostages were finally released 
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as a consequence of the Algeria Accords, signed on the eve of the Reagan inauguration, 
between the United States and Iran with the mediation of the Algerian government on 
January 20, 1981. The conditions of the 1981 Algiers Accord, in exchange for the release 
of the hostages, included the Washington concession to Tehran for a policy of non-
interference in Iranian internal affairs as well as the release of an approximate $10 billion 
in frozen assets. This accord’s legal status, however, was questioned, since although a 
few of the economic sanctions were lifted, the accord itself was not officially ratified in 
Washington. Unlike the Carter administration officials, their successors firmly disagreed 
with the non-interference clause.123   
In addition to the United States’ disapproval of the Algeria Accords, U.S. 
assistance to Iraq throughout the Iran-Iraq War, despite the Carter administration’s 
neutrality policy and rhetoric toward belligerent parties, as well as the USS Vincennes 
incident, further fueled anti-American sentiments in Iran. The relationship between the 
United States and Iraq strengthened throughout the Reagan era. In 1982, during the Iran-
Iraq war, while attempting to offset and derail a potential Iranian victory, the United 
States forged deeper ties with Iraq.124 Part of this tilt toward Iraq included the removal of 
Iraq from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list, the 1982 opening of export credits, and 
official resumption in 1984 of diplomatic relations between Washington and Baghdad. 
Additionally, “Operation Staunch” was launched by the United States with the intention 
of dissuading other governments from supporting Iran via weapons sales during the Iraq-
Iran War. Simultaneously, Washington covertly assisted with arming Iraq through other 
providers.125  
Second, in spite of the Reagan administration’s tilt toward Iraq, in the mid-1980s, 
the U.S. attempted to solicit the assistance of moderate-leaning Iranians with the aim of 
obtaining the release of American hostages by Lebanese pro-Iranian terrorist cells, and to 
encourage dialogue and open strategic talks with Iran. Part of the strategic opening 
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involved U.S. weapons sold and shipped to Iran, including anti-aircraft missiles and anti-
tank weapons, in addition to the exchange of hostages. Notably, it was this last point, the 
exchange of hostages, which ultimately transformed and exploded into the Iran-Contra 
Affair.  
Shortly thereafter, Iran and the United States locked horns on a number of 
occasions between 1987and 1988 in the Persian Gulf over Kuwaiti oil. During Operation 
Earnest Will, the United States attempted to protect Kuwait’s oil shipments from the 
frequent attacks by Iran. Simultaneously, in 1988, several ground offensives pushed 
Iranian forces out of Iraq, giving Iraq somewhat of an upper hand in the conflict.  
Yet another interface between Iran and the United States occurred July 3, 1988, 
further fanning the flames of distrust and animosity between the two countries. The 
shooting of Iranian civilian airliner Flight 655 by the United States was viewed 
differently in each country. Almost 300 people died in this would-be accident. The 
United States affirmed it was a mistake. However, in Iran, this shoot-down, was believed 
to be deliberate and intentional—solidified Iranian beliefs of U.S. support toward Iraq in 
the Iran-Iraq war. Shortly after this incident, Iran signed U.N. Resolution 598, 
establishing a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. Hostilities officially ended August 20, 
1988, a little over a month and a half after the shoot-down.126  
Other U.S. support for Iraq, during the course of the eight years of conflict and 
tensions between Iran and Iraq, included attempts to diplomatically block conventional 
weapons sales to Iran, affording Iraq the needed critical battlefield intelligence, and 
directly engaging in maritime skirmishes with Iran’s naval forces, in an effort to provide 
protection from mines and attacks onto oil shipments transiting the Gulf. In one of these 
maritime engagements between Iran and the United States, Operation Praying Mantis, 
Iran’s naval forces were sliced by more than 25 percent by the U.S. Navy.127 
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E. THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (JANUARY 1989 TO 
1993) 
The first Bush administration attempted to thaw the chilly relations between the 
United States and Iran, at least through its initial rhetoric. In President Bush’s 1989 
inaugural address, he signaled part of his foreign policy approach to Iran would be “good 
will begets good will.”128 The new Bush administration took initial steps toward 
expediting dialogue and contacted key players in Iranian President Rafsanjani’s office. 
Part of the negotiations that aimed to facilitate this warming trend in foreign relations 
between the two countries included the initial release of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon 
held by pro-Iranian terrorist groups as an act of good faith designed to bolster trust. Then, 
Bush would take the necessary steps to start a normalizing process. Part of this 
normalizing trend included the release of Iranian assets that had been frozen by U.S. 
government since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  
Initiating his side of the diplomatic pact, President Rafsanjani started to put 
pressure to release the U.S. hostages on the pro-Iranian Lebanese groups holding them. 
Under this pressure, the hostages gained release. Secondly, at Bush’s request, Rafsanjani 
formally denounced terrorism and softened Tehran’s strong political rhetoric. On 
December 20, 1991, at a Friday prayer sermon, Rafsanjani expressed his disapproval of 
terrorism and condemned anti-Western sentiment and rhetoric.129 However, Bush 
procrastinated with holding to his side of the bargain in the deal.  Additionally, although 
the Islamic Republic helped secure the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon,130 
and maintained a neutral status in the 1991 U.S.-led Persian Gulf war designed to drive 
out Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the Bush administration failed to 
respond positively—if at all—to Iran’s foreign policy decisions at this time as well as its 
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efforts to help thaw the U.S.-Iran chill.131 Moreover, the Bush administration continued 
to maintain its standing policy of unilateral sanctions and use of pressure to alter Iranian 
behavior.132 
Ansari provides arguably the best synopsis for the Bush administrations’ stiff 
foreign policy implementations toward Iran:  “Despite his high standing after the Gulf 
War, Bush was unwilling to risk valuable political capital in an election year by 
appearing to be soft on Iran. Reagan had suffered badly as a consequence of his 
involvement with the Iran-Contra [Affair], and many questions were circulating about 
Bush’s role not only in Iran-Contra but also in the hostage crisis, more than a decade 
previously.”133 
F. THE BILL CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (JANUARY 1993 TO 2001) 
Soon after taking office in January 1993, the Clinton administration took further 
steps to isolate Iran as part of a two-pronged strategy directed toward Iran and Iraq 
known as “dual containment.” According to Mattair, U.S. National Security Adviser, 
Anthony Lake, and the National Security Council’s Director for Near East Affairs, 
Martin Indyk, who had worked for major pro-Israeli organizations in Washington, were 
the original architects of the dual containment policy.134 These two high-level advisory 
officials did not paint a flattering picture of Iran. They maintained that Iran posed a threat 
to the Gulf Arab states with their conventional weapons acquisitions, that Iran was a 
staunch proponent of terrorism, globally, and that Iran was covertly set on a firm 
trajectory to develop WMDs.  In order to deter the Islamic Republic from those alleged 
aims, one of the essential components and arguably the bedrock of the Dual Containment 
policy, according to these two government officials, was an increase in American military 
presence in the Middle East. As it geared itself in the direction of this policy, the United 
States took decided steps toward improving its relations with Gulf countries on the basis 
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of military cooperation. Additionally, the U.S. maritime assets were mobilized. The U.S. 
Navy’s Fifth Fleet reactivated under Central Command. The Fleet operated from Bahrain. 
Its area of responsibility included the Gulf and Indian Oceans.135 
The second significant component of Dual Containment, according to Rusillo, 
was to maintain the Iran-Iraq balance of power. This included preventing Iran from 
acquiring WMD as well as penalizing Tehran for its aggressive foreign policy 
implications by weakening Iran through economic and political sanctions.136 The policy 
of Dual Containment was further formalized by several ‘Executive Orders’ (EO) such as 
EO 12957, 12959 and 13095 as well as by the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). 
ILSA served a very strategic purpose in the Iraq-Iran political dynamic in the Middle 
East. The Act itself—designed to act as a preventive measure hindering the potential re-
emergence of Iran’s oil industry after its devastation during the eight-year war with Iraq 
throughout the 1980s—ensured that countries did not invest more than $20 million into 
Iran’s energy sector.137 
The discovery of significant Caspian Sea region oil reserves during Clinton’s 
second term, however, shifted the realities associated with U.S.-Iranian relations. Due to 
Iran’s geopolitical importance in its neighborhood and proximity to Central Asia and the 
Caspian Sea, several Clinton officials called for a new course of action, since it appeared 
to them that Iran’s revolutionary ideas had stymied and reached an impasse. The new 
policy toward Iran, developed during Clinton’s second term, and known as 
“differentiated containment,” established a road map geared toward normalizing relations 
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in Iraq and Iran. The U.S. strategy in Iraq would maintain status quo and its policy of 
containment. However, with Iran, the U.S. agenda would formally take steps toward 
diplomatic and political normalization.138 
As the Clinton administration re-positioned itself politically vis-à-vis Iran, the 
1997 presidential election of Iranian reformist cleric Muhammad Khatami was fortuitous 
and provided a necessary conduit for rapprochement. Khatami desired more positive 
relations with the United States. His rhetoric included encouraging a “dialogue of 
civilizations” and the breakdown of the current U.S.-Iranian “wall of mistrust.” Both 
nations set a trajectory geared toward establishing the necessary groundwork for gaining 
each other’s confidence and chipping away at the former icy relations between them.139 
The Clinton administration took several high-visibility, very public steps to forge 
a path toward friendship and greater partnership with Iran. Iran was removed as a narco-
trafficking state. The U.S. also stopped using the label “rogue state,” which had been 
used frequently during the first Bush administration as well as Clinton’s first term, with 
respect to Iran. Iran’s leftist opposition group—Mujahedi e Khalgh (MEK)—was put on 
the U.S. State Department’s list of official terrorist organizations. Previous restrictions 
imposed on the sale of medical and agricultural goods were eased and sanctions were 
lifted on foreign companies such as Total, the French oil company that had continued to 
do business with Iran in spite of U.S. pressure.140 
In yet another signal of good U.S. intentions, Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, in a March 17, 2000 speech, formally acknowledged the U.S.’s role in the 
overthrow of Iran’s government in 1953 and continued support for the Shah and the 
oppressive domestic policies he ruled by. She also formally conceded, on behalf of the 
United States, the support Washington proffered to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.141 
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On the Iranian side, President Khatami publicly criticized and condemned 
terrorism as inhumane and crystallized in his rhetoric that Iran would not interfere in the 
conflict between Israel and Palestine if a diplomatic, peaceful solution could be achieved. 
Khatami officially announced his regret, on behalf of Iran, for the 1979–81 hostage crisis. 
When addressing the ever-present question of Iran and the nuclear question, he again 
publicly declared that Iran’s ambitions did not include transformation into a regional or 
global nuclear power, nor was it seen as a future of the nation’s long-term objectives.  
Despite all of the rhetoric between Washington and Tehran, however, the reality 
and outcome of all these strategic shifts, designed as attempts to normalize relations 
between the two countries, the results were quite different than the political posturing 
intended. The process of rapprochement between the two countries eventually failed. On 
one hand, some scholars argued that the reasons behind this failure were primarily the 
Khatami administration’s rejection of mutual dialogue and its more-or-less unchanged, 
frosty position toward the United States. Adherents to this conceptual framework claimed 
that “there was no real difference between hardliners and pragmatists in Iran.”142 On the 
other hand, some other analysts argue that it was primarily the U.S. Congress that 
constrained Bush administration officials to negotiate with Tehran, as well as the general 
unsupportive consensus in Congress regarding the reconciliation policy toward Iran that 
were the main obstacles preventing the formal, diplomatic opening of the Iranian 
question.143  
Normalization of the U.S.-Iran relationship failed to achieve success by the end of 
Clinton’s presidency and his two terms in office. Washington and Tehran were unable to 
move beyond an initial rapprochement. This study concludes that a breakthrough in the 
normalization process was thwarted by an amalgamation of extreme factional rivalries 
between the opposing Iranian political parties, in addition to the lack of a compelling 
offer presented by the Clinton administration. 
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G. THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (JANUARY 2001 TO 2008) 
Cooperation between the Washington and Tehran accelerated after the September 
11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The people of Iran held candlelight vigils 
expressing their grief and solidarity toward the American families, and the Iranian 
government condemned the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks.144 Furthermore, after the “War 
on Terror,” some of the most salient people-to-people talks that occurred between the 
United States and Iran that were held in Paris, Geneva, and Bonn at monthly intervals, 
focused on synchronizing both countries’ cooperation regarding the Afghanistan issue. 
When the United States invaded Afghanistan post-9/11, the Khatami administration 
provided crucial assistance to the United States in the process of defeating the Taliban, 
routing al-Qaeda and establishing a new interim government in Afghanistan. 
Additionally, Tehran opened Iran’s airspace to U.S. aircraft, collaborated with the CIA 
and provided crucial intelligence about the Taliban. Iran also played a critical role 
assisting with the overthrow of the Taliban and the formation of the U.S.-backed national 
government in Afghanistan.145 
Although further cooperation with Iran was considered by the State Department 
and CIA, opposition by the Defense Department and the White House, as well as Israel, 
led by Prime Minister Arial Sharon, interfered with the process. These latter parties held 
strong fears and reservations that further dialogue and collaboration with Iran would 
backfire and instead leave a strong Iran in its place without consideration to nor the 
necessary attention paid to the challenges which continued to persist between Israel and 
Iran. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney’s concurrence on this 
issue led the Bush administration to cease talks in Geneva after the al-Qaeda attacks that 
killed eight Americans and twenty-six Saudis in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 12, 2003.146 
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In 2002, mutual hostilities suddenly erupted when George W. Bush positioned 
Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, in what he termed the “axis of evil.” The Bush 
administration criticized Iran for a series of transgressions, in particular, proliferation of 
nuclear energy, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism. The 
accusations backfired, and Tehran officials responded to these accusations by referring 
the United States by the moniker “global arrogance.”147 Moreover, many Iranians 
interpreted it as a deep insult to their national pride, which, as a result impared the 
credibility of the Iranian reformists who were advocating reconciliation with the United 
States.148 
In late 2003, a prospective opportunity favoring potential rapprochement between 
the United States and Iran came to fruition when the Khatami administration presented a 
comprehensive proposal, known as the “grand bargain,” to the United States. According 
to this proposal, if the United States promised to remove Iran from the “axis of evil,” to 
give a guarantee of security (not to attack Iran), to lift economic sanctions and to allow 
Europe to invest in Iran, then Iran would guarantee to allow full nuclear inspections, help 
transform Hezbollah and Hamas into legitimate political formations, and recognize Israel, 
providing that Israel withdrew from Gaza and the West Bank. The offer was delivered to 
Washington, D.C., by the Swiss ambassador representing American interests in Iran. 
However, the Bush administration chose escalation over peaceful resolution and rejected 
Tehran’s offer. Bush’s unfavorable response to Tehran’s offer came with significant 
consequences. The Khatami reformist movement, despite its efforts toward 
rapprochement with the United States, suffered politically and achieved nothing despite 
their accommodating and more-than-conciliatory overtures and policies toward 
Washington. Resultantly, and most likely unintentionally, the response to Tehran selected 
by the Bush administration strengthened the Iranian hardliner conservatives.149 
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Some scholars argued that the Bush administration’s foreign policy 
implementations toward Iran did not merely undermine the reform-oriented Khatami 
presidency, but also contributed to the breakdown of the reform movement, which 
gradually became a pervasive trend throughout the Islamic Republic.150 A perplexing 
declaration made by the White House on July 12, 2002, which coincided with the third 
anniversary of the pro-democracy students’ uprisings at Tehran University, stated to “all 
Iranians who sought freedom and human rights that they had no better friend than the 
United States.” This suggestion, however, was perceived as meddling in Iranian internal 
affairs and caused a backlash. The unelected ruler of Iran, Ali Khomeini, whom Bush 
sought to condemn, used the message to arouse public anger against the United States. As 
a result, government-sponsored demonstrations in Tehran and other major cities became a 
forum for a brand of virulent anti-Americanism rarely witnessed during Khatami’s 
presidency. Meanwhile, rumors circulated in Tehran that in response to U.S. pressures, 
conservative hardliners were planning to declare a state of emergency, dissolve the 
Majles and dismiss the Khatami government. The conservative-led judiciary closed 
newspapers, harassed and jailed dissidents, forbid the teaching of Western music, insisted 
that shops and restaurants close at midnight, and generally suppressed domestic 
opposition—all in the name of social order.151 
The reformists were purged from Iran’s Majles in the aftermath of the 2004 
elections. Then, on the eve of Iran’s 2005 presidential election, George W. Bush, in 
denouncing Tehran’s theocracy, said, “Iran is ruled by men who suppress liberty at home 
and spread terror across the world. Power is in the hands of an unelected few who have 
retained power through an electoral process that ignores the basic requirements of 
democracy. The June 17th presidential elections are sadly consistent with this oppressive 
record.” Addressing the Iranian people, Bush added, “As you stand for your own liberty, 
the people of America stand with you.”152 From an Iranian perspective, this statement 
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was interpreted as a humiliation of Tehran governance and a meddling of Iranian 
domestic affairs. Hence, it again caused a backlash. Many analysts and politicians believe 
that Washington’s approaches toward Iranian affairs had, perhaps, inadvertently assisted 
the hardliners with gaining popular support throughout the 2005 election, which lifted 
Ahmadinejad to the presidential office. 
Coincidentally, along with the rise of the Washington neoconservatives during 
Bush’s second presidential term was the rise of second-generation Iranian revolutionary 
hardliners to power with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as newly elected president of the 
Islamic Republic. A nuclear Iran became the central concern during Bush’s second term 
as president.153 The priority of Bush’s U.S. foreign policy strategy for Iran centered on 
ensuring and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability, and thus become an 
even greater security threat to the United States and her allies. It became a pervasive 
concern that a nuclear Iran would assert its power on the international stage and 
undermine U.S. strategy and goals in the Middle East even further. The George W. Bush 
administration made concerted efforts to restrict Iranian strategic capacity via political 
diplomacy and extensive international and allied-backed economic sanctions.  
The George W. Bush administration also tabled for consideration more aggressive 
ways of dealing with Iran. The use of non-diplomatic means, including military force and 
compulsory U.S.-led Iranian regime change, became associated with Vice President 
Cheney and his security advisory staff.154 
Iran also, took several steps towards rapprochement and normalization between 
Washington and Tehran. President Ahmadinejad wrote two letters in 2006 indicating he 
sought to ease tensions between his country and the United States, one to President 
George W. Bush and one to the American people. These letters were written in spite of 
the nuclear stand-off between the nations and Ahmedinajad’s anti-American and anti-
Israeli rhetoric. Additionally, after more than 27 years of frozen diplomacy on the issue 
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of Iraqi security, Tehran began negotiations with Washington on this issue. In just two 
years, more than four sets of negotiations concerning Iraqi security occurred between two 
governments.155  
Despite Iran’s diplomatic concessions, U.S. officials stalled and were less 
obliging in return. Ahmedinejad’s letters were snubbed and rejected. In fact, U.S. 
congressional officials still feared the threat of Iran. Congress passed funding requested 
by the Bush administration to initiate covert operations intended to weaken the Iranian 
regime with the ultimate goal of bringing about regime change. Additionally, Washington 
passed Resolution 21 in June 2007, urging the United Nations Security Council to charge 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad with violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention and the 
UN Charter by publicly calling for Israel to be “wiped off the map.”156 Moreover, the 
United States ratcheted up its military threats towards Iran. The Bush administration 
dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf in May 2007 as a form of 
political and military posturing intended to send a message to Iran. U.S. Vice President 
Dick Cheney announced a new direction of the U.S.’ Iranian policy on the deck of the 
U.S.S. John C. Stennis in the Persian Gulf: “We will stand with our friends in opposing 
extremism and strategic threats. We will continue bringing relief to those who suffer and 
delivering justice to the enemies of freedom. And we’ll stand with others to prevent Iran 
from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating this region.”157 
In the end, these threats served to provide increasing support to Ahmadinejad and 
his hard-line government and conservative followers. Independent, reformist, and 
democratic movements, as well as oppositional movements were considered agents and 
servant policies of the United State and other external powers. Furthermore, reformist 
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movements were restricted and suppressed by hardliners. The constant pressure on the 
reformists and their oppression by the hardliners prevented them from organizing and 
confronting Ahmadinejad and his supporters more effectively.158 
H. THE BARACK OBAMA ADMINISTRATION (JANUARY 2009– ) 
By emphasizing the failure of his predecessor’s inability to deal with the 
challenges that the Islamic Republic of Iran presented the United States with, President 
Obama cautioned in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) that “Iran’s behavior 
became more threatening.”159 According to the 2010 NSS, the top priority of the Obama 
administration’s national security policy is reversing the spread of nuclear weapons and 
forming a greater and more secure Middle East that serves U.S. national interests.160 
Tehran and its policies directly contradict both objectives the Obama administration 
seeks. Therefore, the Obama administration’s main efforts and desired end-state with Iran 
included a re-orientation of Iranian policy away from nuclear weapons, Tehran’s 
menacing threats to its geographic neighbors and its general support and promotion of 
terrorist activities.  
Idealistic and hopeful that Tehran would indeed transform under U.S. pressure 
and political coaxing, the Obama administration set a path toward attempting to talk Iran 
out of pursuing its quest for a nuclear capability and to essentially quit its nuclear 
program. As yet another form of the proverbial olive branch, Washington decided that yet 
another piece to its Iranian strategy would be to accept the current Iranian government 
and concurrently to help facilitate Iran’s emergence and expansion into the global 
economy. On the Persian New Year, March 21, 2009, President Obama’s message to Iran 
was clear: a policy of direct diplomacy would be pursued. Simultaneously, Washington’s 
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rhetoric under the Obama administration did not appear to condone options such as 
regime change or military action. However, all options were still left on the table should 
they need to be considered.161 
Despite the well-intended direct diplomacy policy, both State and Defense 
department officials, Hillary D. R. Clinton and Robert M. Gates, maintained and publicly 
expressed their doubts that Iran’s policies would be affected at all by Washington’s 
engagement with Tehran. Others in on Obama’s staff, including Dennis Ross, Clinton’s 
advisor for Southwest Asia (which was focused on Iran) and who was later assigned to 
the White House, believed a clearer carrot-and-stick approach needed to be applied. 
Washington policy toward Iran, in their estimation, required more clarity. Clear 
incentives and crystal-clear penalties needed to be applied should Iran pursue its intended 
nuclear path.162 
I. CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER IV 
This chapter tried to shed a light on formidable challenges faced over the last 
three decades between Iran and the United States. Some view the political chilliness, 
unfulfilled rhetoric and diplomatic stand-off as a power struggle between a formerly 
muscular, robust empire and a civilization that has endured the tests of time versus a 
young, incumbent political-military-economic giant with global, hegemonic ambitions. 
The points of conflict and cooperation that characterize the Washington-Tehran saga is 
driven by both differing ideological frameworks as well as many differences and points 
of convergence when considering national interests.163 
From some United States Congressional officials’ perspectives, even engaging in 
talks with Iran is considered “appeasement.”164 Yet, the United States fails to see the 
political hypocrisy in taking this view, since the United States demands that Iran appease 
Washington’s demands related to its nuclear program and completely abandon it before 
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the U.S. will itself come to the negotiation table. The current containment policy has 
clearly been unsuccessful to the point of failure. The policy is archaic, a Cold War 
mentality remnant consistently applied by Washington toward Iran, since 1979, by both 
ends of the political spectrum. Kinzer, in his book Reset, further attacks Washington’s 
Iranian strategy. Washington’s offers, he says, do not provide the Iranian people with 
what they seek: “respect, dignity, a restoration of lost pride.”165 In fact, the policies only 
fan the flames of antagonism, since Tehran interprets them as a removal of these three 
elements, viewing the policies as disrespectful, dishonorable and undermining their 
dignity as an equal partner. Essentially, the policies retain a large counterproductive 
element. This carrot-and-stick approach “may be appropriate for donkeys,” Kinzer writes, 
but “not for dealing with a nation ten times older than [the United States].”166 
Transforming Iran from an enemy to a friend takes patience, delicate diplomacy and 
reassurance. Threats will only bring out the “fight” mentality in Iran. Iran will not break 
under U.S. pressure. Diplomacy and a strategy of reassurance may be the keys to 
addressing the challenges Iran poses to the United States and its allies. 
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V. POLICY OPTIONS ADDRESSING IRANIAN CHALLENGES 
TO THE U.S. AND HER ALLIES 
For years, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have been attempting to undermine 
U.S. interests in the region in order to achieve their national objective to emerge as the 
hegemonic power in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Iran, therefore, became an 
obstacle for the United States’ long-term strategy in these regions. There seemed to be no 
easy solution to the question of how the United States should deal with Iran given their 
conflicting national interests. For more than thirty years, Washington has attempted 
several solutions under the purview of a number of different presidents and different U.S. 
political party agendas. However, a viable solution still eludes Washington policy-makers 
more than a decade into the twenty-first century. Solutions tried and failed by successive 
U.S. administrations included undeclared warfare, unilateral concessions and almost 
everything in between. Some of these policies, in fact, made some headway into dealing 
with the roadblocks posed by Tehran—although critics will most likely not admit this—
however, Tehran’s support for terrorist associations, its quest for a nuclear capability and 
its broader attempts to upset the region’s status quo remain largely unchanged.167  
The failure of U.S. strategies for more than three decades, as well as the scope and 
gravity of challenges that Iran has posed, have motivated a myriad of pundits and policy 
makers to address the Iranian question from various angles and perspectives. They have 
increasingly released many scholarly pieces, strategic-level researches, analytical reviews 
and assessment papers, especially after the 2003 discovery of the Iranian secret nuclear 
facility, which have proposed different methodologies to deal with Tehran’s 
confrontational ideology. In this chapter, we will analyze four different U.S. policy 
options for dealing with Tehran, which are prevalently argued in scholarly literature 
regarding Iran as well as in the U.S. political environment: the Military Option, 
Containment, Regime Change, and Engagement Option.  
                                                 
167 Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael E. O'Hanlon and 
Bruce Riedel, Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
 66
On one hand, some scholars and politicians have seen Iran as a rival and assume 
that the only way to solve the Iranian question is to defeat Iran by using whatever means 
necessary, including military strikes.168 An example of the military option for dealing 
with Iran can be assessed in Michael A. Ledeen’s book, Accomplice to Evil, which 
presents that “Acknowledging the existence and actions of evil enemies means accepting 
that we [the U.S.] are at war, and then designing and conducting a strategy to win.”169  
On the other hand, some scholars and politicians suggest that the best strategy for 
dealing with Iran is to maintain the Containment strategy—to maintain or strengthen 
current economic sanctions and the political isolation of Iran—instead of the use of 
military intervention.170 For example, Senator Joseph R. Biden, in his speech to the U.S. 
Congress on March 29, 2007, suggests, “we must continue to intensify pressure on Iran 
over its nuclear program with coordinated international sanctions that isolate 
Tehran…”171 In the same vein of thought, by indicating devastating unintentional 
consequences of contingent military strikes, as well as emphasizing the current economic 
problems of Iran that make Tehran more vulnerable to economic sanctions, Kenneth 
Pollack, in his article “Iran: Three Alternative Futures,” as a pragmatic solution, suggests 
that “the best policy for the West to pursue toward Iran would be imposing harsh 
sanctions on Iran to provoke a major internal brouhaha that could (and arguably would 
likely) produce a clear-cut victory for the pragmatists over the hardliners.”172 Similarly, 
Douglass and Hays, in their work entitled U.S. Strategy for Iran, proposes that “the U.S. 
should accelerate current efforts to weaken the Iranian economy and should continue 
coercive pressure on Iran’s leadership through gradually stronger sanctions focused on 
Iran’s economy, nuclear program, leadership and weapons proliferation.”173 
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Yet another policy recommendation for solving the Iranian problem comes from 
reformist-minded politicians and scholars who believe in the importance of bilateral and 
multilateral political negotiations with Iran instead of economic sanctions and political 
isolations. In the last few years, U.S. congressional talks regarding the Iranian issue have 
focused on the necessity of a diplomatic relationship with Iran such as the talks dated 
October 30, 2007—Iran: Reality, Options, and Consequences—and the talks dated April 
24, 2008—Addressing Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. In former congressional speeches, 
Christopher Shays suggested that “the [U.S.] administration must understand that even 
though Iran is a rogue state, it is still a country with enormous influence in the Middle 
East, which we have to deal with one way or the other. It is time for us to start talking 
with Iran diplomat to diplomat, politician to politician and person to person.”174In later 
congressional talks, Senator Dianne Feinstein indicated that “I believe that an Iranian 
policy based on a military solution makes little sense. Only by talking and bringing to 
bear the best efforts of diplomacy can real progress be made. The next Administration 
must evaluate anew our Nation’s approach to this Middle Eastern arena and evolve a new 
approach—one based on robust diplomacy, rather than constant threat of war.”175  
In addition to political and economic isolation, many scholars are well aware of 
the necessity of a new U.S. strategy pursuing diplomatic engagement with Iran.176 Peter 
D. Schmid recommends “...lifting all economic sanctions, replacing U.S.-led political 
isolation of Iran with ‘passive promotion’ of reform, and some military disengagement in 
the region.”177 Similarly, Puneet Talvar, in his article Iran in the Balance, indicates that it 
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is time to abandon the containment strategy inherited from the previous U.S. 
administration and embark upon a new policy of moderate engagement for the U.S. 
administration.178 
A. CONTAINMENT 
America’s preferred policy, when dealing with a nation deemed too aggressive for 
the engagement option or diplomatic dialogue, is considered too powerful for military 
invasion or attack, and/or is too tyrannical or oppressive to be overthrown or for regime 
change to be induced by external actors, is traditionally the policy of containment. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran typifies, and is practically the poster-child for the would-be 
practical application of the containment policy, as defined by Washington’s policy-
makers. As such, the policy of containment has been the preferred option when dealing 
with Tehran for over 30 years. This preferred policy has been adopted largely by default, 
since other strategy options applied, including negotiations, regime change and limited 
conflicts, have achieved limited-to-no success in mobilizing a Tehran more amenable to 
Washington’s aims.179 
The United States’ containment policy’s central feature, since the Islamic 
Revolution, revolves largely around unilateral sanctions. Washington employed these 
unilateral sanctions with regime change as its ultimate end state in addition to the hoped-
for ancillary goals of discouraging weapons sales, commercial trading and foreign 
investment by other countries in Iran. The litany of sanctions imposed on Iran over the 
course of 30 years did limit Iran to some extent in various ways.180 They aided in 
hindering Iran’s capacity for military development and growth and limited Iran in part, 
economically, from advancing and progressing as quickly as it otherwise may have 
potentially been able. The sanctions, arguably, also hampered Iran’s ability to form 
partnerships with a number of key nations who could have proved instrumental toward 
helping Iran achieve its goals. Additionally, the sanctions appeared to also obstruct, to a 
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limited extent, Iran’s capacity to diplomatically wield the power that Iran’s vast natural 
gas and oil reserves could have otherwise garnered. In spite of the limited successes, 
ultimately, the sanctions, and as such, the containment policy toward Iran, failed to 
achieve its intended purposes. The Islamic Republic maintained its efforts to undermine 
the regional peace efforts. Tehran has not been politically, economically or 
internationally isolated. Finally, Iran’s nuclear ambitions have not been deterred.181 
Perhaps more importantly than its partial successes, some scholars argue that 
intense containment policy practices toward the Islamic Republic, particularly unilateral 
U.S. economic sanctions, in effect harmed U.S. national interests rather than transforming 
Iran into a responsible, representative state. Richard N. Haass, in his article, Sanction 
Madness, emphasizes the need to reassess the use and application of U.S. unilateral 
sanctions. According to him, the major reasons for the necessary reevaluation of U.S. 
economic sanction policy compromise not only financial and physiological costs, high 
frequency and low efficiency of the economic sanctions, but also their overall modest 
contribution to United States’ foreign policy goals. Haass adds that increasing the use of 
sanctions is “deplorable,” because of their anemic overall contribution to U.S. strategy 
while simultaneously being costly and even counter-productive. In 1995 alone, sanctions 
cost the United States between $15 and $19 billion and affected more than 200,000 
workers. This cost does not even include the costs of secondary sanctions, leveled against 
those third-party states who do not agree with particular sanctions against targeted 
countries.182  
Unilateral sanctions are even less likely to achieve results because a country under 
sanctions can find alternate suppliers. It is difficult to obtain international support for 
sanctions in general because most governments tend to value economic interactions and 
trade more than the U.S. does and are less willing to forfeit the associated profits. For 
instance, the United States is the only permanent member of the United Nations Security 
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Council to impose comprehensive actions against Iran. Russia and China are principally 
opposing sanctions against Iran. Although the United Kingdom and France principally 
support the United State’s efforts against Iran, their governments and some of their 
companies still continue to trade with the Iranian government.183  
According to Maloney and Taheyh, “Containment is actually obsolete because 
Iran is no longer an expansionist power.”184 Tehran’s revolutionary ideology shifted 
toward a more pragmatic mandate, most notably after the Iran-Iraq war. The war and its 
devastating outcome left Iran’s economy in a shambles and Iran’s leadership had to come 
to terms with its new limitations, shifting global balance of power and its impractical 
ambitions.  
In the future, the containment strategy is less likely to achieve its objectives. Iran 
has emerged today as an increasingly potent, disruptive actor among the Middle Eastern 
sphere of influence, more so than it had been in the nascent days of the revolution, when 
its power to adversely impact international relations should have been at its zenith. The 
United States—unintentionally—played a key role in advancing the strength of Iran’s 
debilitating, disruptive power. The power vacuum that remained post-U.S. invasion of 
Iraq and operations in Afghanistan allowed Tehran to reassert itself as the regional power 
broker, whereas previously, Iranian power and influence had been relatively 
negligible.185 
B. THE MILITARY OPTION 
Some politicians/analysts maintain their staunch position as naysayers and believe 
Tehran will never cooperate diplomatically, or otherwise, with the United States or its 
allies. These people assert that the only policies, that will “speak” to Iran and mobilize its 
government to a response would be United States unilateral military action. Over the 
course of thirty years, they highlight that Washington’s various economic and diplomatic 
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strategies and schemes have failed to elicit the desired responses from Tehran. Adherents 
to this ideological framework presume that since all other methods have been tried and 
failed in pressuring Iran to do the United States’ bidding, that the unilateral use of force 
remains the only—and best—solution. As such, the military option remains the only 
sensible, realistic policy tool, which might change Tehran’s relations with the United 
States. These scholars argue that the military option provides policy-makers the greatest 
benefits rapidly and quickly. The United States would be able to operate with limited, if 
any, allied support and could easily take control of the helm in the operations. Policy 
advocates of the military option claim that this option is more effective than the 
containment policy. Should Iran cross the nuclear threshold, the ability to keep Tehran 
bridled and reigned-in will become difficult to impossible.186  
Strategists, when addressing the military option, consider two different military 
ideas. The first option includes, essentially, a ground invasion and forced regime change, 
similar to Saddam in Iraq and Afghanistan’s Taliban. Once this regime change occurred, 
Washington would provide support to a new government in Iran, which would bend to its 
policy aims including eliminating the nuclear weapons program. The new regime, with 
U.S. backing, would neither support terrorist/insurgent organizations nor other anti-U.S. 
revolutionary entities, and would proceed to eliminate these insidious elements among 
the population. Regional and international terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, the 
Palestinian Jihad and Hamas, would lose a key partner and supporter of their ambitions. 
And Washington’s desired end-state would be achieved: the elimination of a regime that 
consistently countered U.S., interests in the region and in the international community.  
A significant consideration of the military option as an actual policy choice, 
however, would be the magnificent cost involved of its actual implementation. Iran itself 
would be a challenge to invade and successfully occupy in a number of ways than Iraq. In 
addition to more than triple the population and landmass than Iraq, Iran is more like 
Afghanistan topographically. Iran boasts more mountainous terrain features than Iraq, 
including the Zagros Mountains, extending from southwest Turkey through Iran and into 
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Afghanistan as well as other geographic features, making a ground invasion increasingly 
challenging. Additionally, Iran has not been locked down by stringent international 
economic sanctions, unlike Iraq, and has thus had the freedom to mobilize and amass a 
greater military capacity. Since Iran has a more robust military, the potential loss of life 
in armed conflict with Iran would resultantly be higher as well and, therefore, costly both 
militarily and politically.187  
The second choice considered by scholars when addressing the military option 
considers a limited American airstrike campaign aimed at specific objectives. Target sets 
would include Iranian nuclear facilities and major weapons delivery systems. They argue 
that the limited, target-specific airstrike operation keyed in on the destruction of an 
Iranian nuclear weapons capability would, in the end, at the very minimum, delay by ten 
years or more Iran’s ability to produce and acquire home-grown nuclear weapons.188  
But while this second option might buy time, it would be ineffective, long-term, at 
halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Another salient concern is that implementing this option 
could result in unintended consequences, and instead, further solidify Iranian beliefs that 
the nuclear capacity was, in fact, a vital necessity as a preventive measure against future 
armed attacks. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates emphasized this point in a 2009 
speech: “there is no military option that does anything more than buy time.”189  
Iran responded to lessons learned by other countries regarding nuclear facility 
strategic placement. For example, Iranian nuclear installations were intentionally 
hardened and dispersed and strategically located near Tehran or other large population 
centers in response to Iran’s observation of the 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor by 
Israel. Significant hurdles in information and intelligence gathering, in Iran provide U.S. 
military and civilian leadership with little faith that a limited airstrike campaign would 
conclusively provide the desired incapacitation of Iran’s nuclear program. The probable 
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“catch 22” hands U.S. leaders yet another dilemma to consider in the decision-making 
process. A successful military campaign against Iran would incapacitate them; however, 
it would not stop them and would, in turn, enrage Iran such that the airstrike would 
informally act as a catalyst, providing further impetus to their nuclear ambitions and 
justifications for their ignorance of the international community’s laws and public 
opinions.190 
In the long run, use of the military option vis-à-vis Iran would not be viable and, 
in fact, would significantly damage U.S. national security objectives in the Middle East. 
Use of force against Tehran would likely backfire and instead be an impractical solution 
for the Iranian question and the challenges she poses to the U.S. and her allies.191 
The use of a military intervention against the Islamic Republic would translate 
into several adverse reactions by Tehran. In addition to fuelling nationalistic fever and 
strengthening public support for the hardliners, and for a government with nuclear 
ambitions, use of force could also run the risk of Tehran retaliating with armed 
conventional, as well as unconventional, attacks most likely targeted toward key U.S. 
allies, namely Israel. Additionally, the military option would solidify a death sentence for 
the fragile Arab-Israeli peace process and could adversely impact the stabilization 
process in Iraq. Use of this option in Iran by the United States would also generate 
increased regional chaos. Turmoil in Iran could then be channeled to areas of U.S. 
national interests such as Turkey, Afghanistan and even Pakistan.192 
A U.S.-led attack against Iran would most likely increase, particularly over the 
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weapons capability.193 Moreover, the real winners emerging from the use of this option 
would most likely be Iran’s hardliners and radical Islamic anti-American groups in the 
region.194 
C. REGIME CHANGE 
Some politicians and scholars believe that neither the diplomatic nor the military 
options proposed above provide an effective means to deal with the Iranian question. 
They believe that use of the military option strengthens hardliners by increasing public 
support for them. The diplomatic approach would also never ultimately achieve its goal 
due to the regime’s excessive anti-American attitude as well as its fundamentally 
incompatible structure with Washington.195 Therefore, these scholars advocate that the 
only way to protect American vital interests in the region is via regime change—toppling 
hardliners and installing a pro-American government.  
There are three methods that are suggested to enable regime change or, at a 
minimum, help undermine the incumbent regime. The first method would be supporting a 
popular revolution. The main goal of this option would be to create a popular uprising by 
supporting anti-regime groups and motivating people who dislike the clerical regime in 
the Iranian society, particularly among the reformists, intellectuals, students and laborers. 
The second method suggested includes stirring up Iran’s ethnic groups. The major 
objective of this alternative is to create a suitable environment for revolution (upheaval 
and chaos) by supporting ethnic opposition groups, such as Kurds, Baluch, Arab, Azeri 
and so on, and their insurgent activities. The third method scholars suggest is the most 
direct of the three—promoting a coup. This option’s main aim would be to engineer a 
military coup against Tehran by supporting the regime opposition groups in the Iranian 
military. 
In practice, certain former U.S. administrations used one or more of the 
alternatives mentioned above in their attempts to topple the Iranian regime. However, all 
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of them eventually failed to achieve their objective. During the Bush era, for example, the 
Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2005 (H.R. 282 and S. 333) approved approximately 85 
million dollar to help promote democracy (or enable regime change) in Iran, while 
simultaneously tightening economic sanctions already in place against Tehran. This was, 
in the end, another misdirected American initiative. Then, taking a page from the Soviet 
era U.S. foreign policy used in Eastern Europe, which had been successful in its actual 
implementation, the Bush Administration used radio broadcasts and funding and other 
direct assistance to opposition groups aimed at regime change of the Islamic Republic’s 
government as a policy option in Iran. Similarly, Washington worked to defeat the 
regime’s suppression of opposition newspapers, Internet blogs, and other media by 
increasing Farsi broadcasts by the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and other 
information sources.196 
The key point of failure, however, was the rather simple oversight that the fall of 
the dictatorial regimes in Eastern Europe was significantly different from the conditions 
present in Iran at the time of the attempt at implementation of this policy. Iran’s 
theocratic government was not as fragile as those of Eastern Europe. More importantly, 
perhaps, Iranian society was already inundated with information via a myriad of media 
sources, which meant radio broadcasts would have little to no effect. In fact, the Bush 
administration’s actions unintentionally adversely impacted the proponents of democracy 
in Iran, many of whom were seen as puppets of the United States government and 
referred to as “agents of the Great Satan.” 
Simultaneously, Iran’s domestic affairs, as discussed in Chapter III, were 
transforming and re-orienting. Tehran’s former patrimony became a more directed quest 
for a more pragmatic, national-interest based approach, most notably within the last 
decade. After Khomeini’s death, Iranian leaders began to realize the impracticality and 
improbability of promoting their religious ideologies regionally. As such, they chose, 
instead, to contain their version of Islam within their borders. Since then, Iran, in spite of 
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further revolutionary rhetoric, has transformed into a rational, pragmatic actor in the 
international arena, rather than a revisionist state that had been intent on replicating its 
governing style outside itself. 
D. THE ENGAGEMENT OPTION 
The engagement option is yet another Washington policy consideration when it 
comes to dealing with Iran. The main tenet of this policy option is to diplomatically 
encourage Tehran to alter threatening behaviors toward the United States. By offering a 
number of attractive inducements to Iran—economic, strategic, and diplomatic—the 
overall end state would be that Iran willingly chooses to alter its own antagonistic 
policies toward the United States in order to garner the pragmatic benefits of the offer. 
One of the most salient differences, and potentially significant drawback, includes the 
patience required. The engagement policy lacks a solid end date, thus, it might take years 
to implement the desired policy changes while simultaneously reaping the benefits of 
promises by the United States…if it makes any changes at all. Again, rhetoric and 
political posturing can circumvent the actual reality.197 
Adherents to the engagement policy believe that the Islamic Republic is a rational 
actor within the international community and, therefore, with practical offers on the part 
of the United States, Tehran’s policy choices can be altered and redirected. These 
proponents also consider Iran an opportunistic government with regional power 
ambitions. These analysts also argue that sanctions themselves will backfire and explode 
into an Iranian nationalist backlash that will inspire a regime, whose pride and honor has 
been wounded, to reject and decline U.S. diplomatic overtures of any character, 
regardless of the cost. Proponents of the engagement option criticize the containment 
option’s pressure and isolation tactics, which will inevitably fail and have only served to 
set the baseline for a solid foundation of Iranian elite suspicions toward U.S. policies in 
general. Instead, they recommend an engagement-sans-conditions approach. Rather than 
using sticks, carrots and practical incentives should be key drivers behind U.S. foreign 
policy toward Iran in order to achieve the desired aims.   
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Pollack et al, analyze the engagement policy in two separate categories, 
‘incremental/compartmentalized’ route and the ‘grand bargain’ approach. The operational 
design of these two methods differs in packaging, implementation and orchestration. The 
compartmentalized approach focuses on specific issues and separates these unique issues 
from the other. Therefore, separate negotiations take place around individual issues such 
as Iran’s role in the Levant, nuclear matters, and Gulf security among many others 
frequently tabled between the Tehran and Washington policymakers. The bilateral 
discussions, which take place on these specific issues, are considered central to 
engagement advocates.198 
On the other hand, the grand bargain approach engages the challenges on a more 
holistic basis. Instead of separating each issue in bilateral talks with Tehran, Washington 
addresses a package of Iranian concerns while concurrently seeking to develop a 
comprehensive, viable solution set involving concessions from both governments.  
In 2003, Iranian President Khatami offered the Bush administration what could 
easily be categorized as the ‘grand bargain.’ However, Washington refused the offer. 
Many scholars view this refusal as a missed opportunity. A ‘grand bargain’ proposal 
would include demands exchanged by both Tehran and Washington and agreed upon by 
both governments. A plausible example of a grand strategy proposal which could be 
considered for future engagement policy applications toward Iran, might include 
Tehran’s demands—which might include recovery of frozen assets, waiving economic 
sanctions, and U.S. acknowledgment of Iran’s current regime, and forgo future efforts to 
modify it, U.S. acceptance of Iran as a legitimate regional power broker in the Middle 
East, among others—in exchange for Washington’s desired interests in the bargaining 
process. Washington’s national interests in this case may include Iran disengaging from 
further pursuit of its nuclear weapons ambitions, ending its terrorist support and 
extricating itself from all attempts that might adversely impact efforts geared toward an 
Arab-Israeli peace.199 
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The engagement option focus is primarily on positive incentives and neglects the 
use of negative reinforcement. As such, if it is to be effective, it is incumbent on U.S. 
leaders to correctly ascertain what specific incentives may shift and re-orient Iran and re-
balance the competing interests of the two governments. 
In order to conduct a successful engagement policy, it is essential to determine 
effective incentives or inducements for Iran by U.S. decision makers. Considering Iran’s 
current economic problems, waiving economic sanctions and initiating economic 
collaboration may ensure that Tehran is willing to curtail its ambitions. In the same vein, 
regarding Iran’s national security concerns, U.S. support for Tehran’s civil nuclear 
program, with full inspections, may wield significant diplomatic weight and may provide 
the necessary carrot needed in order to change Iran's current political trajectory.  
Even if the engagement option fails to achieve a policy shift in the Tehran in short 
run, according to Mark Bowden, U.S. efforts to collaborate with Iran create significant 
international leverage, assuring international support when further U.S. sanctions and 
pressures are needed. 200 Moreover, Tehran’s image, in the eyes of the Muslim 
community, is adversely impacted if it refuses to continually compromise with 
Washington in the long run. Its “hero of the Islamist cause” image erodes, and in its 
place, a war-mongering, threatening Iran that is out for its own national interests at the 
expense of the international community writ large replaces it. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: LISTENING TO THE IRANIAN VOICE 
“It is my national duty. I vote, so I tell America that I support my [Ahmadinejad] 
government, even if I am not free here.” This statement, made by an Iranian 
schoolteacher, helps reveal the collective sense of the Iranian discontent toward the 
American containment policy and its militarist approach toward Iran. It also reflects a 
sense of Iranian solidarity toward their government, regardless of the undemocratic 
nature of the government.201 A survey conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow before the 
2009 Iranian election showed that “more than 86 percent of Iranians who said they would 
vote for Ahmadinejad also chose ensuring free elections and a free press as among the 
most important priorities they have for the Iranian government.”202 
The Iranian people are speaking. The question here is to what extent is the U.S. 
government listening to the Iranians’ voices? In the past, successive U.S. administrations’ 
punitive policy implications towards Iran rarely—if ever—took into account the Iranian 
people’s thoughts, ideas, inspirations and characteristics. Therefore, all the foreign policy 
initiatives eventually turned out to be unsuccessful. The U.S’s foreign policy toward Iran, 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century, retains many of the elements and central 
beliefs of those of the previous three decades discussed in this paper. Yet again, the 
Obama administration has imposed new economic sanctions against Iran. Similar to 
outcomes of the past, under Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and G.W. Bush, 
many politicians and analysts believe these sanctions are unlikely to achieve success with 
Tehran.203 Nothing has changed. The U.S.’ policymakers continue to lack a solid 
understanding of Iranian history, culture and worldview, which is commonly reflected in 
their foreign policy goals. The United States fails to also separate Tehran’s rhetoric from 
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the reality. In short, Tehran’s decisions often are made with pragmatic national interests 
at their core, rather than Washington’s mistaken and miscalculated assumptions that 
center assumption Tehran’s goals primarily on a religious-based ideology. Without this 
level of holistic comprehension applied to its foreign policy decisions, all policy 
decisions the United States attempts to apply toward the incumbent Iranian regime will 
most likely end in failure, or at best, in a stalemate. Washington and Tehran will continue 
to misunderstand each other and misread each other’s intentions and ambitions. 
Compromises cannot then be made. A standoff between the two governments will likely 
continue and a pervasive mistrust retained among future generations.  
In order to achieve normative relations between these unfriendly rival countries, 
Washington needs to reach out to the Iranian people and to address their concerns—from 
their perspectives. A greater cultural intuition and sensitivity needs to be adopted when 
selecting and applying a foreign policy option toward Tehran’s regime. As President 
Reagan often emphasized during his presidency regarding the Soviet Union, “America’s 
greatest ally against the Soviet Union in winning the Cold War was the average Soviet, 
‘Citizen Ivan.’”204 This lesson learned should not be lost. In fact, it can readily be applied 
to relations between the United States and Iran today. For future approaches addressing 
the question of Tehran, U.S. policy makers need to make concerted efforts to listen to the 
Iranian people. The people of Iran can ultimately partner with the United States and help 
work toward U.S. policy goals, increasing their long-term effectiveness and overall 
success and thawing relations between the two powers.   
First and foremost, not widely understood is that Iranians are pro-American. 
Iranians are neither against the American people nor America itself but rather against the 
severe U.S. foreign policies often imposed on Iran that have adversely impacted Iranian 
social conditions and the overall lives of the Iranian people. As a result of the impact of 
American sanctions on the lives of the average Iranian, distrust toward the United States’ 
foreign policies has trickled out and beyond government-to-government posturing. 
Importantly, the Iranian regime stands unfettered by the effects of U.S. economic impacts 
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to the Iranian people writ large. However, the average Iranian translates this blame not to 
their government but to the United States government. Additionally, Iranians place 
significant emphasis on historical experiences of the past. Although it was almost sixty 
years ago, Iranians still blame the United States for the coup that ousted Prime Minister 
Mosaddeq from power in 1953. Making matters worse, resentments and hostilities are 
exacerbated by disagreements about the United States’ terrorist lists and who is on it—
and who is not. For example, the United States put Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic 
Jihad groups, considered “freedom fighters” by many Iranians, on the list of terrorist 
organizations, but neglect to place Iranian opposition groups on the same list.  
Further solidifying chilly relations and directly impacting the perceptions of the 
Iranian public adversely is the U.S. blocking Iranian integration into the international 
community, such as the U.S. veto against Iran’s participation in the World Trade 
Organization. Moreover, Iranians resent U.S. assistance to regime opposition groups and 
separatist ethnic minorities intent on regime change. They also resent the U.S. “double 
standard” toward Israel and Iran in terms of nuclear programs. While the United States 
allows Israel to maintain its nuclear weapons capacity, Iran is internationally lambasted 
for taking positive steps toward a nuclear capacity. 
Secondly, Iranians are not happy. A study conducted by Kousha and Mohseni 
shows that at the macro level, Iranians, in particular those who live in large cities such as 
Tehran, are not happy.205 Notably, the impact of clerical power and a religious-oriented 
government directly impact the Iranian women. The same study indicates that women’s 
dissatisfaction with their social conditions is the highest. Additionally, more than fifty 
percent of the Iranian population is under the age of twenty. This particular demographic 
is also very dissatisfied and seeks a better life in general. Many blame the U.S.’s foreign 
policy toward Iran for the greater majority of their social and economic domestic 
challenges, although a greater percentage increasingly looks at their own government’s 
policies as another part of the problem.206  
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Thirdly, not all Iranian are Islamists. Younger generations of Iranians do not 
agree with their country’s leadership, in general, and disagree with the “Islamization” 
pervasive in much of Iran. Secondly, they support a greater emphasis on domestic issues 
and spending—employment, housing and individual rights—instead of the budgetary 
expenditures and emphasis given to external and international agendas.207 Lastly, the 
great majority of Iranian people increasingly question current governmental structure as 
well as unelected rule by the Supreme Leader. According to a Terror Free Tomorrow’s 
survey, almost 80 percent of Iranian people, today, desire to elect their leader vis-à-vis 
the 11 percent polled who still favor the current system’s policy of unelected rule of 
Iran’s religious leader, the Supreme Leader.208 These figures indicate the dying 
momentum once behind the Islamic revolutionaries and their basic ideological 
framework. Fewer Iranians today support the worldview and structures established by the 
revolutionaries and are seeking new solutions and new ways forward for Iran in a world 
increasingly interdependent. Adaptation to the impact of globalization on Iran must take 
place or it risks its own ultimate demise. This is felt at all levels, but perhaps most 
especially on the government in a world that is increasingly secularized. 
Fourth, Iranians want nuclear power, not nuclear weapons. A larger majority of 
Iranians perceive U.S. hostility toward Iran stems largely from the fact that the United 
States was once able to control Iran through the U.S.-backed Islamic monarch, who with 
the current Iranian leadership in charge, Washington is unable to manipulate to do its 
bidding.209 Iranians are less convinced that the chilly relations hinge solely on the 
political rhetoric and the more superficial issues of nuclear weapons and terrorism, 
among others. As such, both ends of the Iranian political spectrum, both conservatives 
and reformists, encourage and publicly support development of an Iranian nuclear energy 
and research platform supervised by the IAEA. Importantly, according to a 2008 Terror 
Free Tomorrow survey, more than 80 percent of Iranians desire individual voting rights 
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and free elections and greater economic opportunities—currently limited by sanctions 
and prohibitions key organizations which could help facilitate economic growth such as 
the WTO—rather than concerned about development of a nuclear weapons program. 
More than half of Iranians believe Iran would be safer if it did possess its own 
nuclear weapons capability. However, when the center-stage issue of nuclear weapons is 
tabled specifically in relation to the condition of receipt of outside aid, almost four fifths 
of Iranians would support inspection rights and a provision to not develop nor possess 
nuclear weapons at all. On the related issue of nuclear energy, almost 80 percent support 
its development. Of this, only one third favor nuclear weapon development.210 
Fifth, Iranians generally desire better relations with the United States and 
would like to be integrated into and accepted in the global community. Almost 90 
percent of the Iranian population places economic improvement as a top—if not the 
top—government priority. Accordingly, approximately 70 percent of Iranians polled 
prefer have to their government normalize relations and re-engage in trade with the 
United States.211 As a means to achieve this normal state, Iran would need to provide 
leveraging and compromise with the United States on key issues of concern. These issues 
would include recognition of Israel and Palestine as independent entities, terminating 
support to Shi’a insurgent groups in Iraq, partnering with the United States to facilitate 
the formal establishment of a stable Iraqi regime and provide the transparency the United 
States desires when it comes to nuclear capacity and particularly nuclear weapons. For 
more than 60 percent of Iranians, a few of the most important steps Washington could 
take that would improve opinions of America in Iran include: establishing a free trade 
treaty between Iran and the United States; withdrawing American forces from Iraq; and 
increasing Iranian work and study visas for Iranians in the United States.212 
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Despite the overwhelming Iranian desire for a fully democratic system, the United 
States’ efforts to push the spread of democracy inside Iran would not improve Iranian 
opinions of America, nor would brokering a comprehensive peace between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians. Instead, these actions would backfire and have adverse and 
unintended consequences since it would be perceived as meddling in Iranian domestic 
affairs. Therefore, other courses of action need to be considered as alternatives to these 
two approaches, so as to help eliminate the perception of internal interference by external 
powers. 
Apart from Israel, Iranians now consider the United States as representing Iran’s 
greatest threat. The United States’ constant and very public statements regarding potential 
military action against Iran are taken seriously by the Iranians. Although this may seem 
like a plan that would help the United States achieve its desired goals and coerce Iran to 
do the U.S.’ bidding, in fact this heightens tensions and increases Iran’s resolve to 
intentionally defy what the United States is asking and strengthen their desire to not 
compromise on any of the U.S. key issues. 
Lastly, almost 70 percent of Iranians encourage financial backing for groups in 
Palestine and Lebanon, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militias. 
Iranians believe that these groups fight against oppressive regimes and external forces.213  
All of the elements considered above interface with each other in various ways 
and play a role in the political dancing between Washington and Tehran. However, it is 
important to once again highlight the Terror Free Tomorrow survey results indicating the 
Iranian people’s desire for self-determination, individual political participation and a 
desire to help choose the course of Iran’s future. This underlines the message the United 
States should observe, evaluate, and act on and, ultimately, use toward the advantage of 
easing relations between the two countries: it is the people of Iran that can be the trigger 
point for stabilizing and helping normalize the uneasy, tense relations. The people of Iran 
could, in fact, be the most important element in the puzzling relations between 
Washington and Tehran. The Iranian people could help to facilitate the United States 
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achievement of its goals—a more democratic and non-nuclear Iran—and significantly 
impact the future of Iran on their own terms, as well as the current Tehran regime. 
The last 30 years of U.S. foreign policy towards Iran, including economic 
sanctions, political pressure, containment, intimidation and rogue state rollback, have 
failed to alter the Islamic regime’s aggressive diplomacy and, instead, have fueled hatred 
toward U.S. foreign policies as well as assisted hardliners in gaining legitimacy for their 
aggressive policies. It is important to understand that a regime change in Iran would 
probably happen not because the United State demands it, but because the Iranian ‘youth’ 
demands it. American policy toward Iran should proceed very carefully. It is time for the 
Obama administration to throw away the containment policy inherited by past 
administrations and embark on a new strategy of fair engagement.  
To create a more democratic and internationally accepted Iran will require taking 
into account the Iranian people’s cultural pride, resentment of foreign meddling, and 
inspirations for a better future. To solve the Iranian puzzle, U.S. strategy should be 
shifted from an oppressive approach to a ‘constructive’ policy. Iran should be integrated 
into global world politics, instead of isolated from the world. Finally, the U.S. 
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